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judicial decisions, diversity levels in the national 
bench and bar have been an area of transnational 
concern.  By contrast, little is known about diversity of 
adjudicators and counsel in international arbitration.  
With a lack of accurate, complete, and publicly 
available data about international arbitrators and 
practitioners, speculation about membership in the 
“invisible college” of international arbitration 
abounds.  Using data from a survey of attendees at the 
prestigious and elite biennial Congress of the 
International Council for Commercial Arbitration 
permitted one glimpse into the membership of the 
international arbitration community.  Although 
defining the international arbitration community is 
challenging, rather than leave the “invisible college” 
unexamined, this Article offers one systematic glimpse 
into the global elites of international arbitration using 
data from 413 subjects who served as counsel and 262 
who acted as arbitrators (including 67 investment 
treaty arbitrators).  The median international 
arbitrator was a fifty-three year old man who was a 
national of a developed state reporting ten arbitral 
appointments; and the median counsel was a forty-six 
year old man who was a national of a developed state 
and had served as counsel in fifteen arbitrations.  In 
addition:  (1) 17.6% of the arbitrators were women, 
and there was a significant age difference such that 
male arbitrators were approximately ten years older 
than women; (2) for those acting as international 
arbitrators, we could not identify a significant 
difference in the number of appointments women and 
men obtained; (3) depending upon how development 
status was defined, developing world arbitrators 
accounted for fifteen to twenty percent of arbitrators; 
and (4) for all measures used to analyze development 
status, arbitrators from the developing world received 
a statistically lower number of appointments than 
their developed world counterparts.  Recognizing the 
data revealed diversity in international arbitration is 
a complex phenomenon, the data nevertheless 
supported, rather than disproved, claims that 
international arbitration is a relatively homogenous 
group.  Acknowledging that international arbitration 
may improve over time and diversity issues challenge 
other forms of dispute resolution, diversity levels in 
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international arbitration were somewhat lower than in 
several national court systems but were generally 
reflective of diversity levels in other international 
courts and tribunals.  The international arbitration 
community seems aware of the distortions.  For all 
subjects, 57.5% either somewhat or strongly agreed 
that international arbitration experiences challenges 
related to gender, nationality, or age.  Younger 
subjects and women were statistically more likely to 
identify such challenges as compared to older or male 
subjects; but subjects from states outside the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) were less likely to identify 
challenges when compared to their OECD 
counterparts.  Replication is necessary as the results 
may reflect a limited historical baseline of 
international arbitration global elites.  Given the self-
identified concerns and the symbolic legitimacy of 
broader representation, the international arbitration 
community may wish to explore factors inhibiting full 
utilization of untapped talent and facilitate aims of 
procedural, and potentially distributive, justice.  
Structural and incremental strategies could then 
promote a sustainable international arbitration system 
for the future. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1977, Oscar Schachter referred to “The Invisible College 
of International Lawyers” to describe the elite professional 
community of professors, students, government officials, civil 
servants, and practitioners silently influencing international law.1  At 
that moment in history, little was known about those involved in the 
“Invisible College” of the global international arbitration community.  
Since then, with the classic socio-legal study by Yves Dezalay and 
Bryant Garth,2 tranches of discrete information published by arbitral 
institutions and the recent work of some empirical scholars, we have 
begun to uncover a degree of information about key actors in 
international arbitration.  José Alvarez has described the 
“democratization of the invisible college.”3  There is, however, still a 
 
 1. Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyers, 72 NW. U. L. 
REV. 217, 217 (1977); see also DIANA CRANE, INVISIBLE COLLEGES:  DIFFUSION OF 
KNOWLEDGE IN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITIES (1972). 
 2. YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:  INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
(1996); see also DANIEL TERRIS ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE:  AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES (2007) (conducting a similar 
process to interview thirty international judges to offer a portrait of the public international 
law judiciary); Thomas Schultz & Robert Kovacs, The Rise of a Third Generation of 
Arbitrators?  Fifteen Years After Dezalay and Garth, 28 ARB. INT’L 161 (2012) (updating 
the scholarship of Dezalay & Garth); Maya Steinitz, Transnational Legal Process Theories, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 339, 350–52 (Cesare P.R. 
Romano et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the “invisible college” of international arbitration).  
But see Catherine A. Rogers, Gulliver’s Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of 
Comparative Law, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 149, 153, 166–68 (1997) (identifying concerns 
related to the methodology of Dezalay and Garth). 
 3. Jose E. Alvarez, The Democratization of the Invisible College, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
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dearth of empirical data that cuts across arbitration institutions and 
subject matter to explore the identities of those involved in the 
“invisible college” of international arbitration.  To bring further 
transparency to the “invisible college,” this Article addresses the gap 
within the literature to offer demographic data about members of the 
global community of international arbitration lawyers.4 
The International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) 
provided us with unprecedented access to their biennial Congress in 
2014 to assess the international arbitration community empirically.  
Our objective was to generate data using verifiable social science 
methods to test others’ theories and our own assumptions with the 
hope of improving international dispute settlement. 
 
I.L. POST:  PRESIDENT’S COLUMN (Nov. 8, 2007), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/ 
default/files/ECM_PRO_065334.pdf; see also CATHERINE ROGERS, ETHICS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014) (discussing the “invisible college” of international 
arbitration); David Kennedy, The Politics of the Invisible College:  International 
Governance and the Politics of Expertise, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 463 (2001); Sergio 
Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Marketplace, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387 (2014) 
(identifying a network effect among ICSID arbitrators). 
 4. Queen Mary University has worked with several partners, including White & Case 
and PriceWaterhouseCoopers, to elucidate international arbitration through surveys and 
interviews.  See, e.g., PAUL FRIEDLAND & STAVROS BREKOULAKIS, WHITE & CASE AND 
QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON, 2012 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY:  CURRENT 
AND PREFERRED PRACTICES IN THE ARBITRAL PROCESS (2012),  http://annualreview 
2012.whitecase.com/International_Arbitration_Survey_2012.pdf [hereinafter White & 
Case/Queen Mary University of London Survey]; PAUL FRIEDLAND & LOUKAS MISTELIS, 
WHITE & CASE AND QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
SURVEY:  CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010), http://www.whitecase.com/ 
files/upload/fileRepository/2010-International-Arbitration-Survey-Choices-International-
Arbitration.pdf; GERRY LAGERBERG & LOUKAS MISTELIS, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS & 
QUEEN MARY, UNIV. OF LONDON,  CORPORATE CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION:  
INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES (2013), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/arbitration-dispute-
resolution/assets/pwc-international-arbitration-study.pdf.  Benjamin Davis has conducted 
preliminary research related to diversity of international arbitrators within the United States.  
See Benjamin G. Davis, American Diversity in International Arbitration 2003–2013 (Pre-
Publication Draft) (Univ. of Toledo Research Studies, Paper No. 2014-03, 2013), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2364967.  Recent research by Tom Stipanowich also provides 
empirical perspectives on international arbitration, including aspects related to diversity.  See 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Reflections on the State and Future of Commercial Arbitration:  
Challenges, Opportunities, Proposals, 25 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. (forthcoming 2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2519084 (identifying 
roughly fifteen percent of a sample of international arbitrators as women and exploring the 
literature related to gender diversity in international arbitration); Thomas Stipanowich & J. 
Ryan Lamare, Living with “ADR”:  Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration 
and Conflict Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 
(2013) (conducting empirical research on international commercial arbitration). 
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At the start of the 2014 ICCA Congress, Jan Paulsson argued 
that internal reflection and debate should encourage the improvement 
of international arbitration.  Within two weeks of the Congress and 
our experiment, V.V. Veeder asked the international arbitration 
community “to act now to regulate itself or risk ‘reputational 
disaster’”5 and encouraged the use of data to begin that process.6  The 
twin observations from Veeder and Paulsson underscore the 
importance of the research and the initial findings offered in this 
Article. 
Whereas historic divides in international arbitration mirrored 
Cold War rifts between east and west,7 our data demonstrated that 
two gaps within international arbitration involve development status 
and gender.  Recognizing that there are diversity challenges in 
dispute resolution generally8 and that there have been arguable shifts 
since Dezalay and Garth’s original scholarship,9 international 
arbitration stands poised to engage in self-reflection and develop 
strategies for the future. 
This Article first examines the existing literature to identify 
what was historically known about the “invisible college” of 
international arbitration.  Part II then provides the methodology and 
explains the data collection procedures.  Part III identifies core 
subject demographics with a focus on the identity of arbitrators and 
counsel.  Parts IV and V then explore how subjects perceived their 
own experiences with diversity and then contrast those assessments 
against subjects’ actual experience.  Part VI then considers the 
normative implications for legitimacy.  Part VII acknowledges the 
limitations of the analyses.  The Article concludes the data raise two 
important questions, namely:  what the appropriate baseline is for 
examining the experiences of international arbitration and how the 
arbitration community wishes to respond.  Given the international 
arbitration community’s acknowledgement of diversity concerns, it 
would be constructive to identify factors impeding or preventing the 
maximization of untapped arbitration talent.  Recognizing the need to 
 
 5. Leo Szolnoki, London:  Veeder Backs Paulsson’s Call to Self-Regulate, 9 GLOBAL 
ARB. REV. (Mar. 27, 2014), available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/journal/ 
article/32528/london-veeder-backs-paulssons-call-self-regulate. 
 6. Id. 
 7. V.V. Veeder, Remarks at the ICCA 50th Anniversary Banquet, 3 (May 19, 2011), 
available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/13087101785130/v.v._veeder_speach. 
pdf. 
 8. See infra Part IV (exploring diversity challenges in national courts and 
international tribunals). 
 9. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2. 
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retain quality without unduly burdening party autonomy, there is 
value in identifying diversity opportunities and capacity building to 
promote justice-facilitating objectives and build a sustainable 
international arbitration system for the future. 
I.  THE “INVISIBLE COLLEGE” OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
There is a lack of empirical evidence about the identity of 
actors in international arbitration, particularly those who actually 
serve or might serve as arbitrators. 
Some websites and arbitration organizations offer a degree of 
information about potential arbitrators.  For example, the 
International Arbitration Institute10 and Arbitral Women11 have 
websites where one can search through biographies of registered 
arbitrators.  Institutions like the American Arbitration Association’s 
International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA), and the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) also maintain a general roster or 
database of people willing to serve as international arbitrators.12  
Other commercial services distribute lists of arbitration experts.13  
Despite this general information on those who could theoretically 
serve as arbitrators, there is no centralized public repository 
providing information about individuals who have actually served as 
 
 10. See Search the IAI Directory, INT’L ARB. INST. PARIS, http://www.iaiparis.com/ 
drm_search.asp (last visited May 16, 2015).  
 11. See Find a Practitioner, ARBITRAL WOMEN, http://www.arbitralwomen.com/ 
index.aspx?sectionlinks_id=7&language=0&pageName=MemberSearch (last visited May 
16, 2015).  
 12. Raymond G. Bender, Jr., Three Practical Steps to Avoid an Erroneous Arbitration, 
30 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIGATION 155 (Int’l Inst. for Conflict Prevention & 
Resolution, 2012). 
 13. For example, Who’s Who Legal has a yearly compendium of Commercial 
Arbitration identifying the most highly regarded firms and individuals that requires 
participants to be nominated by peers.  Most Highly Regarded Firms:  Commercial 
Arbitration 2013, WHO’S WHO LEGAL (Nov. 2012), available at 
http://whoswholegal.com/news/analysis/article/30104/most-highly-regarded-firms-
commercial-arbitration-2013/.  Chambers & Partners identifies firms—and individuals 
within those firms—as having elite arbitration expertise and the Global Arbitration Review 
generates an index identifying top entities.  Nationwide:  International Arbitration, 
CHAMBERS & PARTNERS, available at http://www.chambersandpartners.com/12788/ 
738/editorial/5/1 (last visited May 16, 2015); GAR 100—7th Edition, GLOBAL ARB. R. (Jan. 
1, 2014), available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/surveys/survey/948/gar-100-7th-
edition. 
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arbitrators that would permit one to identify and analyze core 
demographic information about international arbitrators.14  Where 
institutions have the internal capacity to gather and analyze the data 
on their own arbitrators, their publicized data focus on basic 
information about arbitrator nationality.  Beyond information 
published in Chambers and Partners, Global Arbitration Review, or 
the International Bar Association’s Who’s Who of Commercial 
Arbitration,15 there is little information available on the background, 
experience, and identities of the international arbitration bar.  As 
such, it is perhaps unsurprising that international arbitration functions 
as a classic “invisible college.” 
Given the lack of holistic information,16 identifying who acts 
as counsel or arbitrator can only be assessed by considering major 
international institutions on a case-by-case basis.  This section 
therefore reviews information about arbitrators from institutions 
including the ICC,17 LCIA, Singapore International Arbitration 
 
 14. Catherine Rogers recommends providing publicly available information about 
arbitrators, or what she refers to as “Arbitrator Intelligence.”  Catherine A. Rogers & Alex 
Wiker, Piloting Arbitrator Intelligence, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Apr. 10, 2014), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/author/catherinerogers; see also Catherine A. Rogers, 
Fit and Function in Legal Ethics:  Developing a Code of Conduct for International 
Arbitration, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 341 (2002); Catherine A. Rogers, Regulating International 
Arbitrators:  A Functional Approach to Developing Standards of Conduct, 41 STAN. J. INT’L 
L. 53 (2005); Hans Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration:  A Single 
Transnational Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 30–32 (1986).  Professor Rogers 
launched and, in January 2015, completed a pilot program to gather arbitrator information.  
See ARBITRATOR INTELLIGENCE, http://www.arbitratorintelligence.org (last visited May 16, 
2015). 
 15. See, e.g., Arbitrator Profiles, INVESTMENT ARB. REP., http://www.iareporter.com/ 
categories/profiles (last visted May 16, 2015); GAR 45 Under 45 2011-Introduction, 6 
GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Aug. 11, 2011), available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/ 
surveys/article/29699/%20gar45452011introduction; Michael Goldhaber, Arbitration 
Scorecard 2013, AM. LAW. (June 24, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/ 
id=1202608198051/ArbitrationScorecard2013?slreturn=20150225152802; see also 
Sebastian Perry, Portrait of the Arbitrator, 9 GLOBAL ARB. REV. (May 6, 2014), 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/32586/portraitarbitrator; Catherine A. 
Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957 (2005). 
 16. Arbitral institutions may wish to collaborate in creating this type of information 
and making it freely available to the public.  See infra note 86 and accompanying text.  
 17. For another ICCA Congress session, the ICC reported that “[i]n 2002, there were 
660 individuals from 62 countries fulfilling arbitral appointments in ICC arbitration, whereas 
in 2012 the numbers increased to 847 individuals from 72 countries.”  Draft Responses of 
John Beechey, 2014 ICCA Congress Panel B-2 Questionnaire, Response to Question 2 (on 
file with ICCA), available at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/conferences-and-congresses/ 
miamiprogramme.html.  The ICC also noted some demographic shifts in party location and 
places of arbitration over the past decade, stating that “whereas the percentage of parties 
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Centre (SIAC), and ICSID and focuses on the nationality information 
they have made available to the public.18  We are unaware of any 
demographic information on counsel, whether based upon nationality 
or otherwise, provided by arbitration institutions. 
The LCIA reported that, in 2012, it had 265 new arbitrations.  
Of those cases, 52.6% of arbitrators were purely nationals from the 
United Kingdom.19  As the rate of U.K. arbitrators at the LCIA was 
roughly sixty-one percent in 2005,20 descriptively, this decrease in 
 
from Africa, Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, and South East Asia increased 
from 38.3% to 46.9% between 2003 and 2012 (i.e., a 22% increase), the percentage of places 
of arbitration located in those regions within the same period increased from 15.6% to 25.3% 
(i.e., a 62% increase).”  Id. at Response to Question 1.  
 18. We were unable to locate demographic data on the websites or elsewhere for the 
ICDR, but parties can pay US$750 for a list of five potential arbitrators.  Arbitrator and 
Mediator Selection, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/arbitratorsmediators/ 
arbitratormediatorselection?_afrLoop=1497714073611632&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWin
dowId=12kiedkwei_1#%40%3F_afrWindowId%3D12kiedkwei_1%26_afrLoop%3D149771
4073611632%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D12kiedkwei_55 (last visited 
May 16, 2015).  We were unable to locate arbitrator information from other institutions 
including the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, the Kigali International 
Arbitration Centre, the Australian Centre for International Commercial Arbitration, the 
Center for Arbitration and Mediation of the Chamber of Commerce Brazil-Canada, or the 
Dubai International Arbitration Centre.  There is some data suggesting that the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) keeps track of the 
nationality of arbitrators, primarily by virtue of a listing process, albeit with mixed success 
in achieving diversity and results.  Compare Jonathan H. Zimmerman, When Dealing with 
Chinese Entities, Avoid the CIETAC Arbitration Process, 53 ADVOC. 23, 23 (Idaho State 
Bar, 2010) (“CIETAC has been in existence since 1956, and boast [sic] that it has 274 
foreign arbitrators (not Chinese Nationals) of its 969 listed arbitrators.  Even with the foreign 
arbitrators, this method of arbitration is [sic] disagreeable prospect with foreign or North 
American companies; especially if you have experienced it.”), with Sarah R. MacLean, 
CIETAC, From Underdog to Role Model:  Bringing the ICC Back to the Forefront in the 
Field of International Arbitration, 16 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 62, 72-73 (2012) (observing that 
CIETAC chairs are primarily Chinese nationals, U.S. parties’ win rates are roughly equal to 
cases lost and outcomes for parties involving other states—like Germany and Australia—has 
been fairly similar). 
 19. See LCIA, REGISTRAR’S REPORT 4 (2012), available at 
http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/reports.aspx (observing that for the 344 total appointments in 
2012, 181 were exclusively U.K. nationals, and that of those, parties appointed 84, the LCIA 
Court appointed 73 and co-arbitrators appointed 24; the remaining 144 appointments were 
“Australian; Austrian; Bahraini; Bangladeshi; Belgian; Brazilian; Canadian; Colombian; 
Czech; Dutch; Egyptian; French; German; Greek; Indian; Irish; Lebanese; Maltese; New 
Zealand; Nigerian; Peruvian; Portuguese; Russian; Singaporean; South African; Swedish; 
Swiss; and U.S.,” but nineteen 19 were U.K. dual nationals, which means that 200 
appointees were U.K. nationals or dual nationals for a total U.K. appointment rate of 58.1%). 
 20. See LCIA, DIRECTOR GENERAL’S REVIEW OF 2005 at 3 (2005), available at 
http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/reports.aspx (observing that 57 arbitrators appointed by the 
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the proportion of British appointees may reflect the need for 
additional arbitrators given the LCIA’s 220% increase in 
appointments.21  Even more recently, more than half of LCIA 
arbitrators were U.K. nationals.22 
Other institutions also have a tendency to derive more than 
half of their arbitrators from the country where the institution is 
located.  SIAC’s 2013 annual report, for example, indicated that out 
of fifty-six new international arbitrations, around fifty-one percent of 
arbitrators were Singapore nationals, and approximately twenty 
percent of arbitrators were from the United Kingdom.23  India and 
Malaysia also had prominent representation at SIAC, with slightly 
less than twenty percent of appointments, demonstrating a degree of 
national diversity.24 
ICSID, which has jurisdiction over cases arising under certain 
commercial contracts, national investment law, and investment 
treaties, publishes a biannual summary of ICSID tribunals and ad hoc 
committees.  By the end of 2013, there were 459 registered cases.  
ICSID provides information by region and country.  ICSID 
arbitrators, conciliators, and ad hoc committee members came from 
seventy-seven different states; forty-nine percent were European 
nationals, twenty-two percent were from North America, thirteen 
percent were from Central or South America, ten percent were from 
Asia or the Pacific, and six percent were from Africa or the Middle 
East.25  The most frequently appointed nationalities were the United 
 
parties were U.K. nationals, 36 nominated by the LCIA court were U.K. nationals, which 
means 93 of the 152 total appointments were U.K. nationals but failing to comment on the 
presence of dual nationals). 
 21. Compare LCIA REVIEW, supra note 20, at 3 (reflecting that the number of 
appointments in 2005 was 152), with LCIA REPORT, supra note 19, at 4 (reflecting that the 
number of appointments in 2012 was 344, an increase of 220% from 2005). 
 22. But see LCIA REVIEW, supra note 20, at 3 (suggesting that “a higher percentage of 
party nominees than of LCIA Court nominees are of English nationality” means that “any 
English ‘bias’ in the nationality of arbitrators has very much to do with the pragmatic 
selection of arbitrators qualified in the most-commonly-applicable law(s) and nothing to do 
with the English origins of the institution”). 
 23. SING. INT’L ARB. CENTRE, ANNUAL REPORT 2013 (2013), http://www.siac.org.sg/ 
images/stories/articles/annual_report/SIAC_Annual_Report_2013.pdf.  These numbers were 
roughly stable over time.  See Resources, SING. INT’L ARB. CENTRE, http://www.siac.org.sg/ 
2013-09-18-01-57-20/2013-09-22-00-27-02/annual-report (last visited May 16, 2015) 
(provides prior annual reports). 
 24. ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note 23. 
 25. INT’L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INVESTMENT DISPS. (ICSID), THE ICSID 
CASELOAD—STATISTICS (ISSUE 2014–1) 18 (2014), https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ 
ICSIDWEB/ resources/Documents/2014-1%20English.pdf [hereinafter 2014-1 STATISTICS]. 
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States (163 appointments), France (155), the United Kingdom (133), 
Canada (97), Switzerland (93), Spain (52), and Australia (50).26  
Waibel and Wu also identified the dominance of developed country 
arbitrators at ICSID.  Specifically, for the 341 ICSID arbitrators 
sitting between 1978 and 2011, they identified sixty-six percent of 
ICSID arbitrators as nationals of OECD states.27 
In investment treaty arbitration (ITA), scholars have begun 
identifying arbitrator demographics.  A study of 102 ITA arbitration 
awards rendered before 2007 identified a pool of 145 ITA arbitrators:  
of that group, 75% were from OECD states and 3.5% percent were 
women.28  Expanded research from 252 ITA awards rendered by 
January 2012 identified a pool of 247 different arbitrators wherein 
80.6% were from OECD states and 3.6% were women.  Given 
repeated appointments of certain female arbitrators, at least one 
woman was present in 18.3% of the ITA awards.  Tribunals 
exclusively containing men constituted the majority (81.7%) of 
awards.29  Other research replicates the general lack of female 
arbitrators in ITA,30 and Rubins and Sinclair suggested in 2006 that, 
 
 26. Id. at 20; see also Noah Rubins & Anthony Sinclair, ICSID Arbitrators:  Is There a 
Club and Who Gets Invited?, 1 GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Nov. 1, 2006), available at 
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/journal/article/16468/icsid-arbitrators-club-gets-invited 
(exploring the nationality of ICSID arbitrators with pre-2007 data, identifying 279 
individuals from 57 different countries who have served as arbitrators, with nationals from 
the United States having the largest number of appointments, followed by French, British, 
Swiss, and Canadian nationals, but observing several Mexican arbitrators were appointed). 
 27. Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political?, 27–41 (Dec. 2011) 
(working paper) (on file with authors), available at http://www.wipol.uni-
bonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-workshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12; see 
also Puig, supra note 3, at 401 (discussing Waibel & Wu, supra note 27, and the 
underrepresentation of developing countries in the arbitration community). 
 28. Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims about Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 75−82 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, Empirically Evaluating]; 
see also Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 438, 459 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Development and Outcomes] (noting 
that, using World Bank classifications for development status, in the pool of presiding 
arbitrators generating final awards, seventy-four percent were from high income states, 
seventeen percent were from upper-middle income states, eleven percent were from lower-
middle income states, and there were no presiding arbitrators from low income states). 
 29. SUSAN D. FRANCK, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION:  MYTHS, REALITIES AND 
COSTS (forthcoming). 
 30. Research conducted by Waibel and Wu identified that ninety-five percent of their 
sample was male and five percent was female.  Wabiel & Wu, supra note 27, at 27; see also 
Lucy Greenwood & C. Mark Baker, Getting a Better Balance on International Arbitration 
Tribunals, 28 ARB. INT’L 653, 656, 663−65 (2012) (analyzing ICSID cases to identify that 
5.6% of all arbitrator appointments were women and suggesting that approximately 6% of 
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“data supports the view that ICSID belongs primarily to 
gentlemen.”31 
II.  THE DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
At the outset, we note that this was first generation research 
from the first dataset of its kind.  We are unaware of anyone else ever 
having performed a live data-collection exercise on international 
arbitrators to collect holistic demographic information.  Although 
there is some data on the “invisible college” available for ITA, there 
is minimal research on international commercial arbitration (ICA), 
which makes this data unique. 
Our survey materials included survey questions exploring 
conference themes of precision and justice and requesting 
demographic information.32  This Article focuses on demographics of 
the international arbitration community related to:  (1) gender; (2) 
nationality; (3) age; (4) linguistic capacity; (5) legal training; and (6) 
professional experiences related to arbitration.  We also asked 
targeted questions related to diversity within international 
arbitration.33 
Our objective was to target the population of international 
arbitration practitioners and arbitrators.  We acknowledge that 
precisely capturing the “international arbitration community” is 
challenging; there is no uniform definition and the community 
 
ICA tribunals contained a woman); Gus Van Harten, The (Lack of) Women Arbitrators in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, COLUM. FDI PERSPS. NO. 59 (Feb. 6, 2012), 
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2014/01/FDI_59.pdf (observing that in 631 appointments in 
249 known ITA cases, only 41 of appointments, namely 6.5%, were women).  Gender 
diversity in private international commercial arbitration may be greater than in ITA.  See 
Stipanowich, supra note 4, at 56−57 (identifying that in a sample of international arbitrators, 
roughly fifteen percent were women and exploring the literature related to gender diversity 
in international arbitration). 
 31. Rubins & Sinclair, supra note 26. 
 32. See Susan D. Franck et al., International Arbitration:  Demographics, Precision 
and Justice, in INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, LEGITIMACY: 
MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES, ICCA Congress Series No. 18, at 33–122 (Albert Jan Van 
Den Berg ed., 2015) (exploring issues related to precision—including advance articulation 
of the burden of proof, whether burdens of proof are outcome determinative, advance 
articulation of cost-shifting standards, document withholding, and tribunal preparation—as 
well as issues related to justice—including arbitrator incentives related to the prestige of 
arbitration, future interaction with co-arbitrators, consideration of future appointments, and 
fraud) [hereinafter ICCA MIAMI CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS]. 
 33. See infra Annex 1. 
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changes as people enter and exit the profession, people age, and cores 
of the community are in motion.34  In order to tap the population of 
interest, our sampling frame was the group of 1,031 ICCA 
registrants.35 
ICCA is a prestigious non-governmental organization 
representing the international arbitration bar.  ICCA’s governing 
board includes some of the most prominent arbitrators in ICA and 
ITA, the secretary general of ICSID, two past presidents of the 
American Society of International Law, the Principal Legal Counsel 
for the Government of Mexico in negotiating NAFTA, the General 
Counsel of ExxonMobil, the Attorney General of Kenya, a former 
Attorney General of Pakistan, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of Singapore, the chair of the Hong Kong International Arbitration 
Centre, the director of the Cairo Regional Centre for International 
Commercial Arbitration, and authors of several of the most important 
international arbitration treatises.36  Our assessment was that ICCA is 
an important group in the international arbitration community.  As 
such, the biennial ICCA Congress is a critical event that international 
arbitration counsel and arbitrators will attend.  While we 
acknowledge the risk of a selection effect, we nevertheless believe 
that ICCA and our data provide a representative sample of the 
international arbitration community and international arbitrators.  The 
ICCA Congress is an elite “must go” event of the international 
arbitration community that is attended by influential members of that 
community.37  The Congress has several advantages:  A historical 
 
 34. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 12, 28, 61, 117, 157, 242, 248, 296 
(discussing certain cores in international arbitration and the intersection spheres of related 
spheres); see also Rogers, supra note 2, at 167 (discussing the “core” of the international 
arbitration community). 
 35. Twelve of the registrants worked on the research team, and two people had 
reviewed earlier drafts of the material during beta-testing.  As such, only 1,017 of the 
registrants were capable of answering the survey.  This also meant that, out of the potential 
subjects, we obtained a 54.3% response rate.  This was a reasonable response rate given 
similar previous studies.  See Edward K. Cheng, Independent Judicial Research in the 
Daubert Age, 56 DUKE L.J. 1263, 1278 (2007) (indicating that a response rate of 
approximately 61% of subjects in a judicial conference is “quite reasonable”). 
 36. ICCA also prepares numerous arbitration publications with the help of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, including the Yearbook Commercial 
Arbitration and the International Handbook on Commercial Arbitration.  See generally 
ICCA Governing Board, INT’L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB., http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/about/governing-board.html (last visited May 16, 2015); International Council for 
Commercial Arbitration, INT’L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB., (last visited May 16, 2015).  ICCA 
is not affiliated with the research team, and none of the authors are ICCA members. 
 37. See, e.g., DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 20 (discussing ICCA’s elite and 
influential nature in connection with the “grand old men” of international arbitration); see 
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pedigree, substantive content exploring transnational legal 
innovations in arbitration, scarcity of programming (i.e. only every 
other year), and a transnational approach.38  Assessing ICCA 
attendees therefore provides a singular opportunity to do “one-stop-
shopping” for data collection on international arbitration.  This high 
value was, in large part, why we selected the ICCA Congress as the 
forum for our research.  Moreover, this methodological approach is 
standard, as it has similarly been used to conduct research on judges 
by way of providing surveys to judges at judicial conferences.39 
During the first plenary session, all ICCA Congress 
registrants in attendance were offered a voluntary opportunity to 
complete a survey confidentially.  While inevitably people who 
registered did not attend the conference or the initial plenary due to 
personal constraints or work obligations, our assessment was that if 
registrants were able to attend the first ICCA Plenary, they did so.40  
Upon delivering the materials to all subjects, 552 people completed 
the survey.  After excluding responses of four subjects who asked 
that their responses not be used for published research, the sample 
contained 548 individuals (the “ICCA subjects”).41 
After receiving the materials, subjects had approximately 
thirty-five minutes to complete all of the materials, and while they 
completed the materials we observed them focused on responding.  
While most subjects completed nearly all of the survey, given the 
voluntary nature, not all ICCA subjects completed all questions.42  
 
also infra note 53 and accompanying text (identifying that a selection effect incentivizing 
elite arbitration specialists to attend ICCA rather than newer entrants to the arbitration 
marketplace may limit inferences from the data). 
 38. See generally Veeder, supra note 7 (discussing the historical pedigree and unique 
nature of ICCA); see also infra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 39. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench:  How Judges Decide Cases, 
93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 777 (2001); Chris Guthrie et al., The “Hidden Judiciary”:  An Empirical Examination 
of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009).  We acknowledge the possibility of 
differences between conferences comprised wholly of U.S. judges and a conference where 
individuals must self-report arbitrator experience.  For limitations to our survey, see infra 
Part VII.  Nonetheless, we believe that our methodology reliably tested known arbitrators, 
see infra note 43. 
 40. ICCA Congress organizers also confirmed that, historically, the first plenary 
session is the most well-attended ICCA session. 
 41. Given the demographic information of the four subjects, which we promised not to 
reveal, their contributions form no part in the analyses of these sections and the small size 
has a de minimis effect. 
 42. All ICCA subjects returned the survey before leaving the plenary session; ten 
subjects returned blank surveys with all questions unanswered.  This means, for individuals 
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For those who completed the materials, we distinguish types of 
information provided.  For example, we provide information on the 
demographics of all ICCA subjects broken down by type of 
experience in international arbitration.  Next, when we focus on 
arbitrators, we demarcate between groups of individuals who have 
served as an arbitrator and also focus on subsets of individuals with 
specific experience in ICA or ITA.  Similarly, we distinguish 
between response patterns for:  (1) all ICCA subjects answering the 
relevant question(s); (2) the subset of subjects responding that they 
had acted as an international arbitrator; and (3) the subset of subjects 
indicating that they served as counsel in international arbitration.43 
We observed that many international arbitrators (including 
arbitrators with multiple appointments) completed the survey.44  
Although our survey did not reach one hundred percent of the 
population of known ITA arbitrators, there were responses from 
sixty-seven ITA arbitrators, which represented a healthy proportion 
(twenty-seven percent) of arbitrators identified in Franck’s research 
on ITA awards.45 
Inferences drawn from the data are only as strong as the 
representativeness of the sample from which the data derive.46  
Although limitations will be discussed in Part VII, it is appropriate to 
acknowledge that, should the registrants of ICCA Miami 2014 and 
those subjects completing the survey not reflect the larger  
 
 
at the first plenary, 98.2% answered at least one question. 
 43. It is possible that there may be a response bias generated from subjects who failed 
to answer all questions.  While we cannot eliminate the risk of response bias, the large 
number of subjects who did respond to the vast majority of questions (and the small number 
of subjects who failed to answer) attests to the underlying validity of the gathered data.  
Nevertheless, replication is necessary to decrease the risk of error. 
 44. Of the 1,017 ICCA registrants capable of participating in the survey, there is 
publicly available documentation confirming that 496 registrants have served as 
international arbitrators.  See supra note 35.  As 262 subjects expressly identified themselves 
as arbitrators, at a minimum, our subjects reflected at least 52.8% of the arbitrators attending 
ICCA.  But see infra Part VII for limitations to this conclusion.  Given conference fees and 
others costs mentioned above, it is possible that we only sampled affluent senior counsel.  
The broader population of counsel in international arbitration may be meaningfully different.  
See, e.g., supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 45. See generally FRANCK, supra note 29 (coding arbitrators on tribunals rendering 
public awards); see also Puig, supra note 3, at 403 (coding arbitrator appointments at ICSID 
from its inception, including both ICA and ITA cases, and identifying 419 different 
arbitrators receiving appointments).   
 46. All data was coded twice, and there was a ninety-seven percent inter-coder 
reliability rate.  Final codes were made after consulting the raw materials. 
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international arbitration community, the value of the inferences in 
this Article decreases. 
Selection effects may impact the results.  First, as the 
conference was in Miami, it is possible that subjects from the United 
States or North America were over-represented.  This generates the 
possibility that the data were systematically skewed.  Second, it is 
possible that arbitration experts from non-North American countries 
were under-represented.47  Although there was a high concentration 
of western European subjects, other countries that have active 
international arbitration centers experienced low representation at 
ICCA.  For example, the China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) reports that it has a heavy 
international arbitration caseload;48 yet, there were relatively few 
attendees from China.49  To address those twin concerns and evaluate 
the value of the baseline descriptive data, the demographic data 
collection should be replicated over time in other venues and as 
ICCA Congresses rotate among international venues.  Forthcoming 
Congresses in Mauritius and Sydney, for example, provide the 
opportunity to reassess differences at geographical venues that are 
proximate to continents with the two largest global populations and 
presumably have large needs for international arbitration services.  
Third, as the ICCA proceedings were conducted in English,50 it is 
 
 47. Under-representation could derive from the need to secure a visa.  Only thirty-eight 
countries qualify for the Visa Waiver program, which eliminates the need for an advance 
visa for U.S. visitors.  Visa Waiver Program, U.S. VISAS:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/visit/visa-waiver-program.html (last visited May 
16, 2015).  The location of ICCA Congress is known four years in advance, and ICCA had 
information on its website expressly devoted to U.S. entry issues and supported participants 
by providing letters of invitation in support of visas. Congress Information:  US Visa Waiver 
Program (VWP), INT’L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB., http://www.iccamiami2014.com/ 
#USEntry; Registration Form, INT’L COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB., 
http://www.iccamiami2014.com.  This decreases, but cannot eliminate, potential distortions 
from visa-related issues. 
 48. Chi Manjiao, Drinking Poison to Quench Thirst:  The Discriminatory Arbitral 
Award Enforcement Regime under Chinese Arbitration Law, 39 H.K. L.J. 541, 557−59 
(2009); Alexander Zesch, CIETAC’s New Rules:  A View through the Critics’ Lens, 16 
VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 283 (2012). 
 49. We observe that, even though the most recent ICCA Congress was in Singapore, 
there were few participants from Singapore. 
 50. English has become the dominant language of international arbitration.  Roger P. 
Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
69, 86 (2003) (“English has become the lingua franca of international arbitration.  One 
prominent arbitrator, Jan Paulsson, recently noted . . . that ‘[t]en years ago, half my cases 
were in French and half in English.  Now, it’s ninety percent English.’”); Stephan W. Schill, 
W(h)ither Fragmentation?  On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment 
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possible that those whose mother tongue is not English (particularly 
arbitration specialists speaking Chinese, Spanish, Hindi, Arabic, 
Japanese, and French,51 which are among the most prevalent 
languages on the planet) were also under-represented.52  Fourth, it is 
possible that ICCA attendees were older and more elite international 
arbitration participants.  Newer entrants to the international 
arbitration marketplace may have greater opportunity costs, with less 
immediate returns, to attending ICCA and the data may therefore 
under-represent newer or non-elite arbitration specialists.53  Fifth, to 
the extent that ICCA is a relatively expensive conference—in terms 
of the conference fee,54 flight, hotel, and opportunity costs of being 
away from work—it is possible that some economically 
disadvantaged specialists were systematically underrepresented. 
We acknowledge the limitations that derive from the 
representativeness of our sampling frame and the data sample.  We 
nevertheless believe that this first generation research provides a 
valuable historical baseline for future researchers and offers a 
 
Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 875, 887 (2011) (“As was the case with most investment treaty 
arbitrations, English became the lingua franca of international investment law.”).  It is 
possible that a conference conducted in English does not generate a large selection effect as 
those without English language skills may not be actively engaged in international 
arbitration.  Yet there are regional areas where international arbitration specialists may share 
a common non-English language. 
 51. The African continent has the most French speakers in the world.  French is also 
the second most common language in Africa with approximately 120 million speakers. 
ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DE LA FRANCOPHONIE, LA FRANCOPHONIE DANS LE MONDE 
2006−2007 (2007). 
 52. ICCA recognizes the need for greater linguistic options at its Congresses and says 
that it is likely to have simultaneous translation in French, English, and Portuguese at its 
2016 Mauritius Congress.  Salim Moollan, Invitation to ICCA Mauritius 2016, INT’L 
COUNCIL FOR COM. ARB., at 7:24–35, http://www.arbitration-icca.org/AV_Library/ICCA_ 
Mauritius_2016_by_Salim_Moollan.html (last visited May 16, 2015). 
 53. International arbitration is sometimes perceived as a club.  Daphna Kapeliuk, The 
Repeat Appointment Factor:  Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite Investment Arbitrators, 
96 CORNELL L. REV. 47 (2010); Puig, supra note 3.  ICCA historically had barriers to entry.  
As such, newer, non-elite arbitration specialists may hesitate to attend ICCA.  Newer 
entrants may be more likely to attend local, regional, or international conferences, 
particularly if conducted in their native language and in a nearby location at low cost.  
Analyzing the international arbitration community at ICCA Miami was an initial effort to 
identify easily observable experts, but there are untapped aspects of the “invisible college.”  
We hope that this initial data collection process is expanded to consider other core groups to 
gather a more complete picture of the international arbitration community. 
 54. Recognizing the costs of ICCA’s Mauritius Congress in 2016, participants from 
Africa will receive a fifty percent discount on their conference fees.  See Moollan, supra 
note 52, at 7:16–22. 
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foundation for others to conduct research on international arbitration 
counsel and arbitrators. 
III.  THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
This Part presents the demographic characteristics of all 
ICCA subjects completing the survey.  It first identifies subjects’ 
professional experiences in international arbitration and dispute 
settlement.  Next, it focuses exclusively on international arbitrators 
for variations in appointment levels by type of international 
arbitration.  It then provides breakdowns of subjects’ gender, age, 
legal training, languages, and nationality.  Using subject nationality 
as a baseline, it also identifies how subjects’ home states ranked on 
the development divide using three different measures to assess 
development status.  Finally, it synthesizes those findings and 
identifies the data supporting the narrative of a relatively 
homogenous group of actors in international arbitration. 
A.  Experience Related to International Arbitration 
As a preliminary matter, we first identify the professional 
experiences of the surveyed subjects.  These demographics provide 
basic information to ICCA and other arbitration organizations about 
opportunities for strategic outreach. 
Overall, the data reflected that ICCA subjects tended to have 
experience either as counsel, some service as an international 
arbitrator (whether ICA or ITA), or a combination of those 
professional experiences.  Table 1 indicates that most subjects were 
involved as counsel in one or more international arbitrations (87%).  
For each subject serving as counsel, they were involved in an average 
of 27 cases (median=15).  These figures contradict claims that there 
are only between 100−200 practitioners worldwide with repeat 
appointments in international arbitration.55  International arbitrators 
were also prominent, with 60.4% of responding ICCA subjects 
indicating they had acted as arbitrator in at least one case.  
Subsection III(B) discusses the frequency of arbitral appointments in 
greater detail.56 
 
 55. Christian Bühring-Uhle et al., The Arbitrator as Mediator:  Some Recent Empirical 
Insights, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 81, 81–82 (2003).  There may be variation in counsel roles as, in 
complex cases, global law firms may employ “local counsel” to handle domestic law issues 
without relinquishing control of case strategy. 
 56. We recognize that the broader ICCA membership may contain more international 
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Experts in international arbitration were moderately well 
represented.  Although it is not clear how many experts there are in 
international arbitration globally, our data indicated that one-third of 
ICCA subjects had served as an expert in at least one arbitration case.  
The experts at ICCA, however, were not heavy repeat players.  Table 
1 indicates both measures of central tendency suggested a low 
number of cases, with a mean of 3.6 and a median of 2. 
 
 
arbitrators, and more international arbitrators were registered for the conference than 
participated in the survey.  For the purposes of this Article, references to ICCA arbitrators 
(or the subset of ICCA arbitrators) incorporate this limitation. 
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Table 1:  Descriptive Data Identifying Frequency of Subjects’ Professional 
Experience in International Arbitration for all ICCA Subjects57 and the Mean, 
Median, and Maximum Number of Cases for ICCA Subjects with a Minimum 































































27.8 2 301 76.4 
 
 57. Some ICCA subjects failed to provide information on professional experiences.  
This may reflect their lack of experience or that the data underrepresents subjects’ actual 
experience.  Subjects failing to answer were therefore omitted from the percentage 
calculations.  Of the 448 subjects analyzed, the following subjects expressly provided 
information about their appointments (or lack thereof):  (1) counsel = 473 responses (75 
missing); (2) expert = 390 responses (158 missing); (3) ICA arbitrators = 432 responses (116 
missing); (4) ITA arbitrators = 386 responses (162 missing); (5) public international law 
adjudicators = 368 responses (180 missing); (6) judges = 376 responses (172 missing). 
 58. We based these categories on gateway experiences to international arbitration.  We 
did not focus on employees of institutions or tribunal secretaries as these individuals do not 
technically adjudicate the disputes.  Nevertheless, we acknowledge that tribunal secretaries 
can play a critical part in the process.  See Constantine Partasides, The Fourth Arbitrator?  
The Role of Secretaries to Tribunals in International Arbitration, 18 ARB. INT’L 147 (2002).  
Two subjects expressly identified themselves as tribunal secretaries.  Although we did not 
code those appointments as arbitrators, it suggests future research might usefully explore the 
effect of tribunal secretaries.  Given methodological and timing constraints, we did not code 
for information about participants or others with experience in academia, non-governmental 
organizations, policy think tanks, or unions.  Future research might also explore 
representation of these groups. 
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There were at least two groups, however, with minimal 
representation at ICCA.  First, few ICCA subjects had been judges in 
national courts.  Table 1 indicates this was less than ten percent of 
subjects.  The wide standard deviation, however, reflects variation in 
subject responses; while one set of subjects had extensive 
appointments, another set of subjects reported smaller appointment 
levels.  Consequently, for the 35 individuals who had acted as judges, 
the mean number of proceedings was 571.3 but the median was 51.  
Second, independent of those subjects serving as ITA arbitrators, 
there were few subjects with experience adjudicating public 
international law disputes.59  Only 17 subjects (or 4.6% of those 
responding) had served on at least one public international law 
proceeding.  Of those subjects, there was a variation in relative levels 
of experience with subjects having an average of 27.8 cases and a 
median of 2 cases.  This low level of representation may, however, 
reflect the small pool of public international adjudicators, such as the 
small number of adjudicators at institutions like the International 
Court of Justice or World Trade Organization.60 
B.  Experience as International Arbitrators 
One critical question involved how frequently arbitrators 
exercised their adjudicative functions.61  Our survey asked subjects to 
report how many times they had served as an ICA arbitrator, and it 
separately asked how many times they served as an ITA arbitrator.  
Overall, as Table 1 reflects, 262 of our subjects (or a little less than 
half) served as an arbitrator in at least one case. 
Table 2 reflects that, overall, ICCA subjects who acted as 
arbitrators were involved in an average of 34.6 cases and the 
statistically “median arbitrator” arbitrated 10 cases.  The variation 
 
 59. The survey and the data analysis differentiated between “public international law” 
and ITA cases.  Subjects were therefore able to distinguish between traditional public 
international law cases and other types of international dispute settlement. 
 60. See, e.g., Shashank Kumar & Cecily Rose, A Study of Lawyers Appearing Before 
the International Court of Justice 1999−2012, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 893, 917 (2014); see also 
José Augusto Fontoura Costa, Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators:  The 
Creation of International Legal Fields, 1 OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES 1, 3 (2011) (discussing 
pools of arbitrators involved in international trade and ICSID disputes). 
 61. See Kapeliuk, supra note 53, at 72−74 (defining “elite” ITA arbitrators as those 
who have served on four or more cases); see also James Clasper, London’s Elite Arbitration 
Groups, 1 GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Apr. 1, 2006) (exploring elite arbitration practices, and 
arbitrators, in London), available at http://globalarbitrationreview.com/journal/article/ 
18197/londons-elite-arbitration-groups.  
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between those two measures of central tendency was driven by a 
small number of arbitrators arbitrating a large number of cases.  25 
subjects sat on more than 100 arbitrations (whether ICA or ITA 
based), 12 subjects sat on more than 200 cases, and one arbitrator 
self-reported arbitrating more than 500 cases.  Quartile breakdowns 
offer insight into how frequently people sit as arbitrators.  Super-elite 
arbitrators in the top quartile arbitrated more than forty cases.  Elite 
arbitrators in the second highest quartile arbitrated between eleven 
and forty cases.  Experienced arbitrators, with relatively less 
experience, were in the second lowest quartile and arbitrated between 
four and ten cases.  The least experienced arbitrators in the bottom 
quartile arbitrated only one to three cases.62 
 
Table 2:  Descriptive Data of the Frequency of Cases for All ICCA Subjects 
Reporting Service as an Arbitrator in at Least One Case and Subsets of ICA 
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64.6 63.0 11.6 
Total Number of Subjects  262 260 67 
 
 
While the data demonstrated that elite arbitrators had more 
appointments than others, the number of ICCA subjects with repeated 
arbitrator experience reflects that the arbitrator bench was not 
necessarily as narrow as one might perceive.63  Acknowledging that 
 
 62. See Table 2. 
 63. See DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 2, at 34−41 (claiming that “key source of 
conflict” in international arbitration practice is the influx of newcomers); see also Catherine 
A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 968 
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this may be a by-product of ICCA’s elite nature, these findings 
should be re-evaluated in other contexts. 
Table 2 reflects that the general patterns for all arbitrators 
mirrors ICA arbitrators.  There was a somewhat different facial 
pattern for ITA arbitrators.  More than half of ITA arbitrators had 
served in only one to two ITA cases.  Super-elite ITA arbitrators (i.e. 
those in the top quartile of appointments) had six or more cases.  
These figures for ITA may, however, reflect the recent and small ITA 
caseload. 
We would be remiss, however, to avoid focusing on one 
intriguing finding.  For the sixty-seven ITA arbitrators, only two of 
those subjects identified that they had not also served as ICA 
arbitrators.  Put differently, only two ITA arbitrators had never 
served on an ICA case.  This provides evidence that serving as an 
ICA arbitrator may be a “gateway” experience or pre-requisite for 
serving as an ITA arbitrator.64  Nevertheless, it is not conclusive that 
all ITA arbitrators must initially serve as ICA arbitrators, as there 
may be other pathways to ITA appointments.  Alternatively, the data 
could reflect that being appointed in ITA expands ICA appointment 
opportunities. 
C.  Gender, Age, Legal Training, Native Language, and Nationality of 
International Arbitrators and Counsel 
Existing literature on arbitrators has provided some 
information on arbitrator background, usually from information 
released from individual institutions or specific subject matter.  
While difficult to prove a negative, we are unaware of any existing 
research that systematically explores the gender, age, and nationality 
of international arbitrators across institutions and subject matter.65  
 
(2005) (observing the “market for international arbitrators operates as a relatively closed 
system that is difficult for newcomers to penetrate”).  
 64. This supports Anthea Robert’s hypothesis that there is a public and private 
international law divide within ITA.  Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms:  Actors and 
Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013); see also 
Bruno Simma, Foreign Investment Arbitration:  A Place for Human Rights?, 60 INT’L & 
COMP. L. Q. 573 (2011). 
 65. There is an emerging literature related to ITA arbitrators.  See supra notes 28−30.  
Given ICSID’s jurisdictional mandate, research on ICSID arbitrators combines ICA and ITA 
arbitrators without reliably distinguishing between the two.  See Puig, supra note 3, at 17−18 
(collecting information on ICSID arbitrators related to name, gender, and nationality); see 
also Waibel & Wu, supra note 27 (collecting information on ICSID arbitrators only 
including gender, nationality, age, and legal education).  There is limited data on ICA, which 
makes this research particularly valuable.  But see supra note 4. 
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Likewise, we are unaware of any research on demographic 
information about the background of counsel in international 
arbitration.  This research offers a baseline for future inquiries.  
Although it provides quantitative information on counsel, the 
discussion in this section primarily focuses on international 
arbitrators. 
There have been suggestions in the popular press that 
international arbitrators tend to be “pale, male, and stale.”66  
Presuming the phrase reflects public concerns about diversity in 
international arbitration, the question is whether inclusiveness (or 
lack thereof) is empirically verifiable.  We acknowledge that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to generate a unitary definition of 
diversity and inclusiveness in international arbitration.  We therefore 
focus on several aspects to create a pluralistic assessment.  First, we 
explored the gender composition of ICCA subjects, as gender is 
generally a stable characteristic.  Second, we explored the age 
distribution of ICCA participants.  Third, we identified variations in 
legal training, linguistic capacity, nationality, and development 
status.67 
Given the existing literature reflecting questions about gender 
disparity in international arbitration, the descriptive data on gender is 
vital.  Table 3 reflects the gender distribution of participants, 
arbitrators, and counsel.  For all ICCA subjects and the subset of 
counsel, roughly three-quarters were men, and one quarter were 
women.  The distribution shifted when evaluating those serving as 
arbitrators—with men becoming even more dominant.  Namely, 
82.4% of arbitrators were men and 17.6% were women. 
The results also suggest a degree of a “gray hair factor” 
where, although all subjects were typically in their late forties, those 
individuals serving as arbitrators were somewhat older.  Table 3 
indicates that the mean age of all subjects was 48 (median=47); and 
mean counsel age (48) was similar (median=46).  In contrast, the 
 
 66. Michael D. Goldhaber, Madame La Présidente:  A Woman Who Sits As President 
of a Major Arbitral Tribunal Is a Rare Creature.  Why?, 1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (2004), 
www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=158 (“[A]rbitration is 
dominated by a few aging men, many of whom pioneered the field.  In the words of Sarah 
Francois-Poncet of Salans, the usual suspects are ‘pale, male, and stale.’”). 
 67. We recognize that defining diversity in international law is complex as notions of 
“minority status” in national contexts may not apply on the international plane.  For 
example, although Gabrielle Kirk MacDonald is a U.S. national, which is an OECD and high 
income state, she is an African-American woman.  See infra note 142.  We therefore look at 
each diversity-related variable in isolation but welcome a more nuanced scale for classifying 
diversity constructs in international law. 
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mean age of responding arbitrators was 54 (median=53).  These 
results may not be unusual.  Other research suggests the average age 
of an active member of the bar in California was 48, whereas the 
average age of California judges was 60;68 but the age of median 
judges has been decreasing in several jurisdictions.69 
 
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics of Gender and Age for All ICCA Subjects, the 
Subset of those Working as Arbitrators, and the Subset of those Working as 
Counsel 
 
Variables All Arbitrators Counsel 
Subject Gender:    
   Percentage 











Men 74.5% (n=392) 82.4% (n=216) 76.0% (n=314) 
 










   
Mean 48.5 54.4 48.0 
Median 47.0 53.0 46.0 
Minimum 24.0 29.0 24.0 
Maximum 85.0 85.0 85.0 
Standard deviation 12.7 11.7 12.3 
    
Total number of 
subjects 





 68. Arden Rowell & Jessica Bregant, Numeracy and Legal Decision Making, 46 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 191, 225 n.120 (2014). 
 69. See M. Margaret McKeown, The Internet and the Constitution:  A Selective 
Retrospective, 9 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 135, 142 (2014) (noting “the median age of 
active judges has declined:  from 58 years old in 1990 to 50 years old in 2010”); Abhinav 
Chandrachud, Does Life Tenure Make Judges More Independent?  A Comparative Study of 
Judicial Appointments in India, 28 CONN. J. INT’L L. 297, 305–06 (2013) (indicating the 
average age at appointment was fifty-four years for the Australian High Court, fifty-six years 
for the Canadian Supreme Court, and sixty-four years in the Supreme Court of Japan but 
noting that the average age at appointment was increasing in India and Japan).  
454 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [53:429 
Age as a Function 
of Gender:70 
   
 
Age of Women 
   
  Mean 42.0 47.5 41.3 
  Median 40.0 45.0 40.0 
  Minimum 27.0 32.0 27.0 
  Maximum 71.0 68.0 65.0 
Standard deviation 10.0 9.3 8.4 
    
Total number of 
Women 
128 46 96 
  
Age of Men 
   
  Mean 50.6 55.8 50.0 
  Median 50.0 55.0 50.0 
  Minimum 24.0 29.0 24.0 
  Maximum 85.0 85.0 85.0 
Standard deviation 12.8 11.7 12.5 
    
Total number of 
Men 
386 216 310 
 
The age difference between male and female participants was 
statistically meaningful.71  Using a t-test to analyze mean differences 
in age,72 there was always a significant gender difference in the age 
of ICCA subjects (t(512)=6.872, p<.001, r=.29, n=514), those 
serving as counsel (t(404)=6.385, p<.001, r=.30, n=406), or those 
serving as arbitrators (t(251)=4.337, p<.001, r=.26, n=253).  The 
effect sizes all suggested the size was statistically medium.73  The 
direction was such that women attending ICCA, regardless of their 
 
 70. When looking at age as a function of gender, there were fewer subjects, as six men 
and six women identified their gender but not their age. 
 71. Statistical significance “provides a measure to help us decide whether what we 
observe in our sample is also going on in the population that the sample is supposed to 
represent.”  TIMOTHY C. URDAN, STATISTICS IN PLAIN ENGLISH 62 (3d ed. 2010). 
 72. An independent samples t-test evaluates group differences for a parameter with two 
levels (like gender) and a normally distributed dependent variable (like age).  Id. at 93. 
 73. See LOUIS COHEN ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN EDUCATION 113–16 (6th ed. 
2007) (providing Cohen’s conventions for understanding effect sizes and indicating a 
“small” effect is present when r=.10, a “medium” effect is present when r=.30, and a “large” 
effect is present when r=.50), whereas effect sizes below r=.10 are less than “small” and 
arguably of trivial impact). 
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arbitration experience, were younger than men.  Table 3 indicates 
that, for women arbitrators, the average age was 47.5 whereas the 
average age of male arbitrators was 55.8. 
Another aspect of subjects’ diversity is type of legal training 
received.  Table 4 reflects that ICCA subjects had a variety of 
different legal training.  For all ICCA subjects, common law was the 
dominant legal training, with 46% of the subjects exclusively trained 
in a common law jurisdiction.  There was also a strong civil law 
component, with 30% of subjects trained exclusively as civil lawyers.  
There was also a hybrid as 24% of subjects had training in both 
common and civil law.74  The dominance of common law training 
was also present in the subset of arbitrators, but was not as facially 
prominent.  Specifically, 38.5% percent of ICCA arbitrators had 
training exclusively in common law whereas 33.8% of ICCA 
arbitrators were exclusively trained as civil lawyers, and 27.7% of 
ICCA arbitrators had training both in common and civil law.75 
Language is another way to explore the diversity of 
international arbitration.  ICCA subjects spoke fifty-eight different 
native languages.  Although Mandarin and Spanish are the two most 
prevalent languages in the world,76 this dominance was not present in 
the ICCA subjects, the subset of counsel, or the subset of arbitrators.  
For ICCA subjects generally and counsel, English, Spanish, and 
Portuguese were most dominant, together accounting for nearly 
seventy percent of the languages spoken.  The proportions were 
slightly different for the subset of arbitrators, as the dominant 
languages were English, German, and French (responsible for over 
sixty percent of total language capacity).  Given the dominance of the 
Chinese population worldwide, it was noteworthy that only four 
arbitrators’ native language was either Mandarin or Cantonese. 
As regards geography, ICCA subjects represented sixty 
different nationalities.77  Table 4 indicates that, irrespective of 
 
 74. These proportions were similar for those serving as arbitration counsel. 
 75. The results reflect a case selection effect.  In theory, more U.S. common-law 
trained lawyers attended, as Miami was a geographically convenient forum.  Future ICCA 
researchers may wish to explore this issue further to see, as the venue changes, whether this 
demographic aspect fluctuates or remains stable. 
 76. Summary by Language Size, ETHNOLOGUE:  LANGUAGES OF THE WORLD, 
http://www.ethnologue.com/statistics/size (last visited May 16, 2015). 
 77. For example, Asia has the largest population in the world, and Africa has the 
second largest.  Distribution of the Global Population 2014, by Continent, STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/237584/distribution-of-the-world-population-by-continent 
(last visited May 16, 2015); see also Current World Population, ONE WORLD NATIONS 
ONLINE, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/world_population.htm (last visited May 16, 
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whether analyzing ICCA subjects or the subset of arbitrators, the 
trend was to have the greatest representation from Europe and North 
America; the lowest proportions came from Africa and Asia.78 
When focusing on the subset of arbitrators, some nationalities 
were arguably underrepresented.  A potential assessment of under- or 
over-representation could be evaluated using nationality information 
about the parties or subject matter in dispute.79  This information is, 
unfortunately, generally not publicly available, and international 
arbitration institutions like ICSID,80 the LCIA,81 the ICDR,82 and the 
 
2015). 
 78. There is a possible disjunction between arbitrators’ place of residence and their 
state of origin or nationality.  We used nationality, as it is an indicator of where individuals 
express political or civil rights.  Future research might also explore the variance by state of 
residence, state where legal training was obtained, or another state reflecting a substantial tie 
(i.e., location of property ownership).  
 79. Articles 39 and 53(3) of the ICSID Convention have nationality requirements that 
would skew this analysis for ICSID Convention cases. Look at this rule for ad hoc 
committees, for example: 
“None of the members of the Committee shall have been a member of 
the Tribunal which rendered the award, shall be of the same nationality 
as any such member, shall be a national of the State party to the dispute 
or of the State whose national is a party to the dispute, shall have been 
designated to the Panel of Arbitrators by either of those States, or shall 
have acted as a conciliator in the same dispute.” 
 80. ICSID’s statistics are relatively blunt.  When focusing upon state respondents, 
information generally is grouped by geographic region and information on investors is either 
unavailable or grouped into geographic clusters.  ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD—STATISTICS 
(SPECIAL FOCUS—EUROPEAN UNION) 6, 11 (2014), available at https://icsid.world 
bank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/resources/Documents/Stats%20EU%20Special%20Issue%20-
%20Eng.pdf [hereinafter EU STATISTICS]; 2014-1 STATISTICS, supra note 25, at 11, 25.  But 
see EU STATISTICS, supra note 80, at 7 (identifying EU states involved in ICSID cases).  
Arbitrator appointments, however, are provided using arbitrator region and the specific 
nationality.  See EU STATISTICS, supra note 80, at 23−24; 2014−1 STATISTICS, supra note 25, 
at 18−20, 30−32. 
 81. The LCIA provides statistics on party nationality in percentages, rather than filed 
cases, and also sometimes groups together states.  The most recent report indicated, between 
2012−13, approximately 16−19% of parties were from the United Kingdom, 7−8% of parties 
were from the United States, 3−5% of parties were Swiss, and 3−4% of parties were 
Russian.  LCIA, REGISTRAR’S REPORT 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/reports.aspx.  
 82. The American Arbitration Association’s Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), 
makes general statements about expanding party nationality or provides grouped statistics 
using “Europe, Middle East and Africa” to report party nationality.  AMER. ARB. ASS’N, 
2013 ANNUAL REPORT & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 18 (May 15, 2014), available at 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2021420&revision=late
streleased; see also INT’L CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 3 THE ICDR INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION REPORTER 2–4 (July 2012), https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc= 
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SCC83 do not provide systemic nationality data.84  In the absence of 
such information, but the readily available information on global 
population, we use global population85 and global gross domestic 
purchasing power parity (global GDP)86 as comparative baselines.87 
Although highest in world population (60.27%), Asian 
arbitrators were the second least represented (10%) of ICCA 
 
ADRSTG_019805.  
 83. The SCC provides the most constructive information and identifies party 
nationality and number of cases.  They report that Swedish parties dominate the caseload 
with over 158 parties, while there were 15 Russian parties, 12 Norwegian parties, 12 
German parties, and 7 Swiss parties.  ARB. INST. OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, STATISTICS 2013:  A STRONG YEAR 2 (2013), available at http://www.scc 
institute.com/media/45932/scc-statistics-2013.pdf. 
 84. The ICC provides data on party nationality; but it is only available for a fee. 
Statistical Reports, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE:  DISPUTE RESOLUTION LIBRARY, 
available at http://www.iccdrl.com/statisticalreports.aspx (last visited May 16, 2015). 
 85. See supra note 77. 
 86. Given the temporal gap between commercial activity and the start of arbitration, 
we initially focused upon global GDP between 2000−2010.  See Report for Selected 












 87. As discussed earlier, there is no central, public repository on information about 
arbitrators or all international commercial disputes.  See supra notes 10−26 and 
accompanying text.  As we appreciate that comparisons using party nationality or location of 
the subject matter of the dispute provide a better uniform baseline, we encourage 
international arbitration institutions to collaborate to create and provide such information to 
the public.  Likewise, it might be useful to identify foreign investment flows as an 
alternative proxy, although selecting the time period for the comparison may prove 
challenging given shifts in global investment flows and the decades of accumulated 
experience from international arbitrators.  Focusing on either inbound or outbound 
investment flows, however, may not fully capture trans-border economic activity and could 
miss other economic activity including locally financed assets, mergers and acquisitions, 
portfolio investment, intellectual property transfers, and other types of critical international 
commercial activity.  Future research could therefore explore the appropriateness of other 
potential baselines and how those measures might suggest alternative understandings of 
representativeness in international arbitration.  
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arbitrators.  Notably, although China and India together contain 
approximately 33% of the world’s population and roughly 30.4% of 
global GDP, less than 3% of participating arbitrators were from those 
states.  Meanwhile, despite Africa’s second highest population 
(15.41%), only two African countries were in the twenty countries 
with the highest global GDP (Egypt and Nigeria—2.5%) and Africa 
exhibited the lowest level of representation (0.4%).  Other 
nationalities were arguably over-represented.  Europe has 10.37% of 
the world’s population and roughly 12.8% of global GDP, but 48.2% 
of the arbitrators were European nationals.  Similarly, the United 
States and Canada have 4.93% of the world’s population and 14.5% 
of global GDP, but 27.9% of the ICCA arbitrators were from North 
America, and of the seventy arbitrators from North America, only 
one was from Mexico.  Other states were somewhat more balanced in 
representation.  For example, Australia and New Zealand contain not 
quite one percent of world population and less than one percent of 
global GDP;88 they represented four percent of ICCA arbitrators.  
Although South America has 8.49% of world population, 9.6% of 
ICCA arbitrators were from South America.89 
 
Table 4:  Percentages and Frequency Distributions (in parentheses) of Legal 
Education, Native Language, Continent, and Nationality for All ICCA 
Subjects, the Subset of those Working as Arbitrators and the Subset of those 
Working as Counsel 
 
Variables All Arbitrators Counsel 
Legal Education    
Common Law 45.7% (n=237) 38.5% (n=100) 44.6% (n=184) 
Civil Law 30.3% (n=157)   33.8% (n=88) 29.1% (n=120) 
Both 24.1% (n=125)   27.7% (n=72) 26.4% (n=109) 
    
Total number of subjects                    519                 260 413 
Mother Tongue     
English 48.6% (n=248) 43.3% (n=110) 47.4% (n=191) 
Spanish   10.2% (n=52) 7.1% (n=18) 10.4% (n=42) 
Portuguese     9.4% (n=48) 8.3% (n=21) 10.7% (n=43) 
 
 88. Using nominal GDP unadjusted for PPP, Australia had roughly 2.7% of GDP.  
 89. Table 4 reflects that the strongest representation from Latin America was Brazilian.  
Given ICCA-related outreach, it is possible that earlier ICCA Congresses and/or geographic 
proximity may affect participation in future conferences and grow the global arbitration 
community.  Brazil, however, was also one of the top twenty largest contributors to global 
GDP, representing three percent of global GDP. 
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German     6.5% (n=33) 10.6% (n=27) 6.5% (n=26) 
French 5.7% (n=29) 10.2% (n=26) 6.5% (n=26) 
Dutch 2.2% (n=11) 3.5% (n=9) 2.7% (n=11) 
Other languages 17.4% (n=89) 17.0% (n=43) 15.8% (n=64) 
    
Total native languages 38 26 32 
    
Total number of subjects  510 254 403 
Continent    
Europe 36.4% (n=183) 48.2% (n=121) 37.2% (n=148) 
North America 33.6% (n=169) 27.9% (n=70) 31.4% (n=125) 
South America 12.7% (n=64) 9.6% (n=24) 14.3% (n=57) 
Asia 10.9% (n=55) 10.0% (n=25) 11.1% (n=44) 
Australia / New Zealand 4.6% (n=23) 4.0% (n=10) 4.8% (n=19) 
Africa 1.8% (n=9) 0.4% (n=1) 1.3% (n=5) 
    
Total number of subjects 503 251 398 
Nationality     
United States 29.0% (n=145) 23.2% (n=58) 26.8% (n=106) 
United Kingdom 10.6% (n=53) 9.6% (n=24) 10.4% (n=41) 
Brazil 8.6% (n=43) 7.2% (n=18) 9.6% (n=38) 
France 5.0% (n=25) 8.8% (n=22) 6.1% (n=24) 
Australia 3.8% (n=9) 2.8% (n=7) 4.3% (n=17) 
Germany 3.6% (n=18) 4.8% (n=12) 3.0% (n=12) 
Canada 3.4% (n=17) 4.8% (n=12) 4.1% (n=16) 
Switzerland 2.8% (n=14) 5.6% (n=14) 3.5% (n=14) 
China 2.6% (n=13) 1.2% (n=3) 1.5% (n=6) 
India 2.4% (n=12) 1.6% (n=4) 2.8% (n=11) 
Sweden 2.4% (n=12) 2.8% (n=7) 2.8% (n=11) 
Netherlands 1.8% (n=9) 2.4% (n=6) 2.3% (n=9) 
Spain 1.8% (n=9) 2.4% (n=6) 2.0% (n=8) 
South Korea 1.6% (n=8) 2.4% (n=6) 1.8% (n=7) 
Italy 1.1% (n=6) 2.0% (n=5) 0.8% (n=3) 
Argentina 1.0% (n=5) 0.4% (n=1) 1.0% (n=4) 
Austria 1.0% (n=5) 2.0% (n=5) 1.0% (n=4) 
Philippines 1.0% (n=5) 0.4% (n=1) 1.0% (n=4) 
Portugal 1.0% (n=5) 1.2% (n=3) 1.3% (n=5) 
Russia 1.0% (n=5) 1.6% (n=4) 0.5% (n=2) 
    
 




 4.4% (n=82)  




    
Total number of Subjects 500 250 395 
Dual Nationals    
United States 17.6% (n=6) — 19.4% (n=6) 
Italy 14.7% (n=5) 10.0% (n=1) 16.1% (n=5) 
United Kingdom 11.8% (n=4) 20.0% (n=2) 9.7% (n=3) 
Germany 8.8% (n=3) 30.0% (n=3) 9.7% (n=3) 
Australia 5.9% (n=2) — 6.5% (n=2) 
Brazil 5.9% (n=2) 10.0% (n=1) 3.2% (n=1) 
Switzerland 5.9% (n=2) 20.0% (n=2) 6.5% (n=2) 
 
Other Dual Nationalities 
 
Total number of Subjects 34 10 31 
 
 90. This table reflects only those nationalities where, for all ICCA subjects, there were 
five or more nationals from the country.  Thirty-eight other states had at least one but less 
than five subjects each, namely:  Bahrain, Belgium, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Finland, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Syria, 
Tanzania, Tunisia, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Vietnam. 
 91. The other primary nationalities of arbitrators were Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, Singapore, Slovakia, Ukraine, Venezuela, and 
Vietnam. 
 92. The other primary nationalities of counsel were Belgium, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Guatemala, Jamaica, Japan, 
Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru, Singapore, Slovakia, South 
Africa, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Vietnam. 
 93. For both primary and secondary nationalities, there were sixty different states. 
 94. This table reflects only dual nationals where there were two or more nationals for 
all ICCA subjects.  There were also single dual nationals from Czech Republic, France, New 
Zealand, Spain, Venezuela, Uruguay, Lebanon, Ireland, Nigeria, and Portugal.  
 95. This dual national arbitrator was from Nigeria. 
 96. There were also dual nationals from the Czech Republic, France, Ireland, Lebanon, 
Nigeria, Portugal, Spain, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  
90 12.8%(n=32)  91 13.9% (n=53)  92
 58  93
29.4% (n=10)  10% (n=1)  28.9% (n=9)   
  
94 95 96
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Historically, much literature has focused upon the prevalence 
of “western” parties in international law;97 in a post-Cold War era 
with different policy concerns, this terminology is somewhat 
outmoded.  As a final aspect for measuring the scope of diversity, we 
therefore explored the development status of subjects’ nationality.98  
Defining “Development Status” is a perpetual challenge, as there is 
no consistent legal definition.99  Development has a degree of 
subtlety and can mean different things to different people.  For 
example, the World Trade Organization does not offer a precise 
measurement for development; rather, it permits member states to 
self-define development.100  The lack of a consistent definition has 
caused confusion in international law.101  Without a predefined, 
exclusive measure, it is appropriate to use measures based upon 
“judgments made for entirely different purposes by other 
researchers.”102 
 
 97. See, e.g., Kurt Gaubatz & Matthew MacArthur, How International is 
“International” Law?, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 239 (2001); see also Puig, supra note 3, at 19 
(identifying that, for only ICSID arbitration, “most arbitrators are from specific developed 
countries.  Individuals of seven nations (New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, 
France, the UK, and the US) represent almost half of total appointments”). 
 98. Future analysis might explore country of residence, as nationality and residency are 
not necessarily equivalent.  Given limited time and space constraints, we selected nationality 
to identify where the international arbitration pipeline derives, rather than where they reside 
currently.  Using nationality and residency together might also provide evidence of the 
mobility of the international legal services market.  David S. Law, Globalization and the 
Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1323–30 (2008); see also ORLY 
LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE:  WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE LEAKS, RAIDS, AND 
FREE RIDING (2013). 
 99. Marc L. Bush & Eric Reinhard, Developing Countries and General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 719, 
719, 723 (2003) (analyzing development dimensions in GATT disputes and observing the 
difficulty in making distinctions between developed and developing states). 
 100. See Who are the Developing Countries in the WTO?, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (“There are no WTO definitions 
of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries.  Members announce for themselves whether they 
are ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries.”) (last visited May 16, 2015); see also Anu 
Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 1, 32 n.159 (2011) (“WTO rules do not contain a definition of a ‘developing country.’  
Instead, states self-designate themselves as developed or developing countries as part of a 
political calculus.”); Andrew D. Mitchell & Joanne Wallis, Pacific Pause:  The Rhetoric of 
Special & Differential Treatment, The Reality of WTO Accession, 27 WISC. INT’L L.J. 663, 
696–97 (2010).   
 101. Benjamin L. Liebman, Autonomy Through Separation?:  Environmental Law and 
the Basic Law of Hong Kong, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 261–62 (1998). 
 102. GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL ENQUIRY:  SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 157 (1994) (emphasis in original); see also Susan D. Franck et al., 
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We used three measures to define development status.103  
First, development was operationalized as a binary categorical 
variable—OECD Status—that derived from a state’s membership in 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).  OECD membership is generally, but not always, associated 
with higher levels of development and therefore is a blunt proxy.104  
Second, development was also operationalized using a four-category 
variable—World Bank Status—that derived from a World Bank 
classification system grouping states as High Income, Upper-Middle 
Income, Lower-Middle Income, and Low Income.105  The World 
Bank’s main criterion for classifying economies is gross national 
income per capita.106  Third, development status was operationalized 
using a continuous variable—HDI status—from the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Index (HDI).  HDI 
evaluates elements including life expectancy, education, and income.  
HDI is a continuous variable and ranges from 0.0 (undeveloped) to 
1.0 (completely developed).107 
Regardless of which measure was used, the results indicated 
that nationals from developed states dominated the roster of all ICCA 
subjects generally, as well as the subsets of counsel and arbitrators.  
For all groups, Table 5 demonstrates that seventy-five percent (or 
more for the subset of arbitrators) of subjects were from an OECD or 
High Income state; and we observe that none of the ICCA subjects 
were arbitrators or counsel from Low Income states.  There were 
similar results for those who were dual nationals.  Using HDI scores 
frames the demographics more starkly for the subset of arbitrators.  
The median HDI score for arbitrators meant that half of the 
 
Through the Looking Glass:  Understanding Social Science Norms for Analyzing 
International Investment Law, 2010-11 Y.B. ON INT’L INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y 883 (2011). 
 103. Irrespective of the measure used for coding development, all codes were generated 
using the scores available in 2014.  
 104. Jan Wouters & Sven Van Kerckhoven, The OECD and the G20:  An Ever Closer 
Relationship?, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV 345 (2011). 
 105. The World Bank analytical classifications used for coding are available at Country 
and Lending Groups, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-and-lending-
groups (last visited May 16, 2015). 
 106. Data:  How we Classify Countries, WORLD BANK, 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378834-how-does-the-world-
bank-classify-countries (last visited May 16, 2015). 
 107. As HDI coding methodology changed in 2011, we used data provided by Dr. 
Milorad Kovacevic, Chief Statistician at the Human Development Report Office of the 
United Nations Development Programme.  All of scores from Dr. Kovacevic used the 
updated 2011 methodology to re-evaluate the historical and current rankings.  
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arbitrators were from states with “very high human development” as 
classified by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
and were in the top twelve most developed nations; using the mean 
meant that the average arbitrator came from a state whose HDI score 
put it in the top thirty most developed states in the world.108 
 
Table 5:  Descriptive Statistics of the Development Status of All ICCA 
Subjects, the Subset of Arbitrators, and the Subset of Counsel as a Function of 
OECD Membership, World Bank Classification, and the Human Development 
Index.109 
 
Variables All Arbitrators Counsel 
OECD Nationals: 
Percentage (Frequency) 
   
OECD national 74.6% (n=373) 82.4% (n=206) 75.2% (n=297) 
Non-OECD national 25.4% (n=127) 17.6% (n=44) 24.8% (n=98) 
    
Totals 100% (n=500) 100% (n=250) 100% (n=395) 
OECD Dual Nationals: 
Percentage (Frequency) 
   
OECD national 79.4% (n=27) 80.0% (n=8) 80.6% (n=25) 
Non-OECD national 20.6% (n=7) 20.0% (n=2) 19.4% (n=6) 
    
Totals 100% (n=34) 100% (n=10) 100% (n=31) 
World Bank 
Classification of Primary 
Nationality: 
Percentage (Frequency) 
   
High income 76.4% (n=382) 84.8% (n=212) 76.5% (n=302) 
Upper-middle income 16.6% (n=83) 10.8% (n=27) 16.7% (n=66) 
Lower-middle income 6.4% (n=32) 4.4% (n=11) 6.8% (n=27) 
Low income 0.6% (n=3) — — 
    




   
 
 108. This shifted only slightly for arbitrators who were dual nationals.  For those 
arbitrators with dual nationalities from states  with “very high human development,” the 
median HDI score was in the top seventeen most developed states and the mean HDI score 
was in the top thirty-five states. 
 109. Forty-eight subjects did not provide nationality information. 




 Percentage (Frequency) 
High income 85.3% (n=29) 80.0% (n=8) 87.1%(n=27) 
Upper-middle income 11.8% (n=4) 10.0% (n=1) 9.7%(n=3) 
Lower-middle income 2.9% (n=1) 10.0% (n=1) 3.2%(n=1) 
Low income —  — — 
    
Totals 100% (n=34) 100% (n=10) 100% (n=31) 
HDI Classification of 
Primary nationality 
   
Mean 0.859 0.874 0.860 
Minimum 0.434 0.471 0.471 
1st quartile 0.816 0.875 0.816 
2nd quartile (median) 0.909 0.909 0.909 
3rd quartile 0.937 0.937 0.937 
Maximum 0.955 0.938 0.938 
    
Standard deviation 0.105 0.086 0.102 
    
Total number of subjects 500 250 395 
HDI classification of 
Secondary nationality 
   
Mean 0.868 0.842 0.870 
Minimum 0.471 0.471 0.471 
1st quartile 0.875 0.839 0.875 
2nd quartile (median) 0.883 0.897 0.885 
3rd quartile 0.924 0.920 0.937 
Maximum 0.938 0.920 0.938 
    
Standard deviation 0.094 0.142 0.095 
    
Total number of subjects 34 10 31 
 
 
It is possible that these data did not fully reflect the global 
international arbitration community.  Nevertheless, the data offer 
previously unavailable cross-sectional information about the 
prevalence of men (Table 3), certain nationalities (Table 4), and 
developed world actors (Table 5). 
The data may reflect a potential “pipeline” problem related to 
capacity-building in international arbitration.  While an analysis of 
the origins of diversity challenges in international adjudication is 
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beyond the scope of this Article,110 we note that not all states have 
the same level of legal infrastructure; and the men and women of 
states with less developed legal education systems might be less well 
represented in international arbitration.111  Separately, not all states 
are equally supportive of women’s education—legal education 
specifically—or may have other non-legal barriers that make 
women’s professional work challenging.  Even if states support of 
women’s education today, they may not have historically invested in 
women’s education or professional training.  It is also possible that, 
as international law courts and tribunals generally exhibit diversity 
challenges,112 the data reflect larger diversity challenges in 
international law.  These findings require replication to assess their 
ongoing value and explore whether the international arbitration 
community changes over time.113 
D.  Key Findings 
The data reflect that counsel and arbitrators were the primary 
ICCA attendees and presumably core members of the “invisible 
college.”  The standard number of appointments for counsel ranged 
from a mean of thirty to a median of fifteen.  For those appointed as 
 
 110. Future work may explore theories explaining the systematic representation of 
women and/or developing world arbitrators.  Others have explored the lack of women in 
judicial positions generally or international courts and tribunals, which could have 
similarities to in international arbitration.  See Nienke Grossman, Shattering the Glass 
Ceiling in International Adjudication (forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2472054 (exploring theories to explain the lack of women 
adjudicators in public international law); see infra note 146 and accompanying text 
(exploring theories about women’s lack of presence on the bench).  
 111. See Greenwood & Baker, supra note 30, at 654, 657 (identifying that “the 
additional obstacles which an international arbitrator must overcome in order to succeed may 
penalize women disproportionately” and discussing how factors “including office climate, 
difficulties in managing dual careers, lack of female role models and mentors, lack of 
flexible work options and attitudes to flexible working” can contribute to a “pipeline leak”). 
 112. See Nienke Grossman, Sex on the Bench:  Do Women Judges Matter to the 
Legitimacy of International Courts, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 647 (2012) (identifying the lack of 
women on international courts and tribunals). 
 113. Greenwood and Baker suggested that problems in international arbitration extend 
beyond having sufficient women in the pipeline.  They acknowledge that even though there 
are fewer men than women entering U.K. law firms, more men become partners.  They also 
observe that the “best estimates of 6% of women appointed as arbitrators on international 
arbitration tribunals is just over half the 11% figure for female partners on international 
arbitration teams.”  Greenwood & Baker, supra note 30, at 658.  But see Stipanowich, supra 
note 4, at 56 (identifying that roughly 15% of international arbitration respondents in his 
study were women). 
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arbitrators, individuals obtained thirty-five appointments on average, 
but only a median of ten.  The number of ICA appointments was 
generally larger than ITA appointments.  The ICCA data did not 
reflect large numbers of public international law and national court 
judges in the dataset. 
ICCA subjects were representative of arbitration specialists 
from many continents, nationalities, languages, and legal training.  
Within that breadth, there were notable concentrations that tended to 
be dominant in terms of size; the data confirmed narratives regarding 
a lack of diversity in the field of international arbitration.  Counsel 
and arbitrators were predominantly from developed states, with a 
higher concentration of developed state subjects in the subset of 
arbitrators.  Likewise, counsel and arbitrators were predominantly 
male, with higher proportions of men in the subset of arbitrators.  
Meanwhile, we identified a statistically meaningful age difference 
between men and women arbitrators, such that males were older and 
females were younger. 
The “median international arbitrator”114 was a fifty-three 
year-old man who was a national of a developed state and had served 
as arbitrator in ten arbitration cases; and the median international 
counsel was a forty-six year-old man who was a national of a 
developed state and had served in fifteen arbitrations.  The 
demographic data offers preliminary information about the 
practitioners and adjudicators of international dispute settlement.  In 
contrast to the “invisible college” of international law professionals 
described by Schachter,115 this information aids in the 
 
 114. Other research has explored the attributes of median judges, often in the context of 
panel decision-making.  See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
37, 47–49 (2008) (discussing “median judges” in various contexts); Andrew D. Martin, 
Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 
N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1277 (2005) (discussing and defining the “median justice” in the context 
of the U.S. Supreme Court empirical research); see also Michael Abramowicz, A 
Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts, 89 CAL. L. REV. 231, 309–10 (2001) 
(discussing median judges).  The “median arbitrator” is a composite of the median 
characteristics from this Article, which inevitably means the characteristics could refer to an 
individual who may not actually exist.  We hope that the imbuing measures of central 
tendency within a single, albeit potentially fictional, repository offers a useful construct. 
 115. See Schachter, supra note 1, at 217 (“the professional community of international 
lawyers . . . though dispersed throughout the world and engaged in diverse occupations . . . 
[is] a kind of invisible college dedicated to a common intellectual enterprise.”); see also 
Harlan G. Cohen, Lawyers and Precedent, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1025 (2013); Tom 
Dannenbaum, Nationality and the International Judge:  The Nationalist Presumption 
Governing the International Judiciary and Why it Must be Reversed, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
77, 129–31 (2012) (discussing the “invisible college” involved in international dispute 
settlement that begins from legal education and grows through transnational legal dialogues 
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demystification of international arbitration and offers data to the 
arbitration community. 
IV.  PERCEIVED DIVERSITY CHALLENGES 
Several scholars identify that the diversity of those presiding 
over adjudicatory bodies, particularly international courts and 
tribunals, is an important factor for the legitimacy of those bodies.116  
Nienke Grossman argues that adjudicative bodies “where one sex is 
severely under- or over-represented lack normative legitimacy 
because they are inherently biased.”117  Even if men and women do 
not decide cases differently,118 she posits, “sex representation matters 
for sociological legitimacy because relevant constituencies believe 
they do” and “representativeness is an important democratic 





amongst law firms and other networks). 
 116. See generally Grossman, supra note 110 (exploring how women’s participation on 
international courts and tribunals affects their legitimacy); see also Sally J. Kenney, 
Breaking the Silence:  Gender Mainstreaming and the Composition of the European Court 
of Justice, 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 257, 265–66 (2002) (exploring whether the paucity of 
women on the European Court of Justice’s bench affects its legitimacy and why); Leigh 
Swigart, The “National Judge”:  Some Reflections on Diversity in International Courts and 
Tribunals, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 224 (2010) (“Like their domestic counterparts, 
international courts and tribunals depend on public faith in their judges to inspire confidence 
in court decisions and in the judicial system more generally.”). 
 117. Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 112, at 652. 
 118. In other contexts, more diverse decision-makers have made different, and more 
legally accurate, legal assessments.  See Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter:  
Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 
(2005) (identifying that the presence of at least one female judge on panels reviewing sexual 
harassment and sex discrimination cases was more than twice as likely to find for plaintiffs); 
Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group Decision Making:  Identifying Multiple 
Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
579 (2006) (finding that diversifying mock jury panels created broader information 
exchanges and decreased risk of error).  It is possible, but not certain, that panels with 
diverse arbitrators could make different decisions. 
 119. Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 112, at 652.  Grossman suggests this is 
true only where men and women think differently or approach cases in a different way as 
those making decisions should reflect those affected by the decisions.  
468 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [53:429 
arbitration impact its symbolic legitimacy120 and, more broadly, that 
of international courts and tribunals.121 
For ITA, as a hybrid creature involving public international 
law, concerns about sociological legitimacy, democratic legitimacy, 
and democracy deficits are especially relevant.122  Concerns about 
diversity also impact the legitimacy of ICA and disputes purely 
among private parties.  Although the New York Convention123 and 
UNCITRAL Model Law124 require domestic judiciaries to give 
arbitration awards deference, that deference derives from trust in the 
integrity of arbitrators and the arbitral process.  Consequently, 
domestic courts need not give international arbitration procedures or 
awards carte blanche and they retain the power to oversee the parties, 
their lawyers, and the arbitrators.  Some jurisdictions have 
historically expressed a “judicial hostility” to arbitration, and others 
have perceived arbitration as an unwarranted intrusion into state 
authority.125  States permit and honor arbitration proceedings, in part, 
because of their perceived utility; should those courts or legislatures 
believe that ICA is illegitimate or problematic, they retain the 
capacity to re-absorb those cases into judicial dockets.  There have 
been calls to regulate international arbitration more closely regardless 
 
 120. See infra notes 214, 223 and accompanying text (discussing Thomas Franck’s 
conceptions of legitimacy, including symbolic legitimacy, and implications for international 
law). 
 121. See Kumar & Rose, supra note 60, at 25−26 (calling for empirical research 
comparing diversity imbalances at the ICJ with international arbitration).  
 122. See Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO. 
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 107 (2009) (discussing a sociological approach to legitimacy); Nienke 
Grossman, The Normative Legitimacy of International Courts, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 61 (2013) 
(discussing a democratic theory of legitimacy); see also Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of 
International Governance:  A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 
AM. J. INT’L L. 596, 601 (1999) (asserting that popular views about an authority comprise 
one dimension of that authority’s legitimacy); Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The 
Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405, 405–06 (2006) 
(suggesting that a global public standard of legitimacy can help citizens distinguish 
legitimate institutions from illegitimate ones). 
 123. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].  
 124. UNCITRAL Model Law on Int’l Com. Arb., G.A. Res. 61/33, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, 
annex I & A/61/17, annex I (July 7, 2006), available at http://www.uncitral.org/ 
pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf (last accessed July 31, 2014). 
 125. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (noting 
“centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements”); GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1.01 (2d ed. 2014) (providing a brief history of international 
commercial arbitration). 
2015]   THE DIVERSITY CHALLENGE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 469 
of whether a dispute involves a state or state-related entity.126  Even 
private dispute resolution, therefore, is dependent on public trust.127  
As Salim Moollan observed, there are risks when international 
arbitration is viewed as an imposed, foreign process.128  There is a 
risk that international arbitration could be seen not simply as an 
alternative method of dispute resolution, but as a shadow legal 
system. 
Diversity concerns are not unique to international 
arbitration.129  As a report by Oxford Economics explains, 
“[e]mployee diversity—across lines of gender, ethnicity, country of 
birth, age, and others—has become a hot boardroom topic across the 
globe.  It is becoming not only a critical issue for human resources 
(HR) executives, but a major part of corporate strategy.”130  Some 
suggest that, “diversity should be considered by both policymakers 
and businesses when making investment and policy decisions as it 
 
 126. See, e.g., Sundaresh Menon, International Arbitration:  The Coming of a New Age 
for Asia (and Elsewhere), Remarks at the Singapore ICCA Congress, ¶43 (2012), available 
at http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/13398435632250/ags_opening_speech_icca_ 
congress_2012.pdf (“As we contemplate these problems of moral hazard, ethics, inadequate 
supply and conflicts of interests associated with international arbitrators, it seems surprising 
that there are no controls or regulations to maintain the quality, standards and legitimacy of 
the industry.”); Sundaresh Menon, Where We Have Been, Where We Should Go, in ICCA 
MIAMI CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 32, at 1035 (“I believe that this is the essential 
challenge of this age—we are moving very rapidly from a time when the key players knew 
one another; when they often looked similar and spoke similarly; and when they had a 
common legal, cultural and social background; to a period in which there is unprecedented 
growth in numbers and in diversity.”). 
 127. Parties only have the right to choose arbitration, and choose their arbitrators, where 
states generate laws granting parties those rights.  This reflects that, while party autonomy is 
a critical value in international arbitration, it is not the only value. 
 128. See Moollan, supra note 52, at 2:12–3:16 (observing the disjunction between “the 
formal discourse repeated at every conference we go to emphasizing the inclusiveness of 
international arbitration” and “the perception of our field, in the developing world as 
predominantly Euro- and American-centric” and suggesting that this gives “rise to a risk of 
arbitration being perceived as foreign process imposed from abroad, as an unwanted but 
inevitable corollary of trade and investment flows” but suggesting “the answer to this is to 
make sure that the developing world has its say in the process and in its development and for 
international arbitration to progressively to become part and parcel of the legal culture of 
developing countries”). 
 129. Other aspects of diversity that are worthy of exploration, which we did not have the 
time or space to explore, involved sexual orientation, religion, marital status, disability, or 
medical condition.  See generally Davis, supra note 4 (exploring the gender, race, disability, 
and sexual orientation of international arbitrators in the United States). 
 130. OXFORD ECON., THE GLOBAL DIVERSITY REPORT:  AN ANNUAL GUIDE TO MEASURE 
GLOBAL EMPLOYEE DIVERSITY 1 (2011), available at https://www.oxford 
economics.com/my-oxford/projects/128931.   
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can affect competitiveness which is key to economic growth and the 
quality of life of a nation’s citizens.”131  This section, therefore, first 
explores the basic demographics of international arbitration and 
places those findings within a larger context.  The section then 
explores subjects’ perceptions about potential diversity challenges 
within international arbitration; and it then contrasts this with 
subjects’ actual experiences as arbitrators and counsels to explore 
their actual experiences with the diversity of international arbitrators.  
Finally, it explores the implications for justice and legitimacy within 
international arbitration. 
A.  Contextualizing the Demographics of Diversity 
Earlier, Tables 2−5 offered descriptive data on diversity levels 
within the international arbitration community.  The data suggested 
the “median” ICCA subject and arbitration counsel was a male, forty-
six years of age, with some common law legal training, from a 
developed state.  In contrast, the “median” arbitrator at ICCA was a 
male, fifty-three years of age, with some training from a common law 
jurisdiction, and from a developed state.  Less than eighteen percent 
of the arbitrators were women,132 twenty percent (or less) were from 
 
 131. Id. at 21. 
 132. We would be remiss not to recall that women arbitrators were statistically younger 
(forty-eight years old on average) than their male counterparts (fifty-six years old on 
average).  Given this possibility, one might expect a slightly lower representation of women 
with the need to achieve the requisite years of experience.  Greenwood and Baker suggest 
that female partners make up about eleven percent of international arbitration teams; and 
when compared to their data on arbitrators, they infer that less than half of that eleven 
percent serve as arbitrators and thereby suffer from “more than the usual ‘pipeline leak.’”  
Greenwood & Baker, supra note 30, at 658.  This creates three possibilities.  First, 
Greenwood and Baker’s extrapolation that women account for six percent of international 
arbitrators could be wrong, and their derivative inference is incorrect.  Second, it means that 
the seventeen percent proportion of women arbitrators in our sample was over-representative 
of women arbitrators.  This could reflect that either women who have multiple appointments 
elect to attend ICCA or benefit from ICCA networking opportunities.  But see Stipanowich, 
supra note 4, at 56–57 (identifying that roughly fifteen percent of subjects in a survey of 
international arbitrators were women).  Third, as several studies identified that women 
accounted for five to nine percent of the ITA arbitrator pool, there may be meaningful 
differences in the appointment of women in ICA and ITA arbitration and there may be 
comparatively more women acting as ICA arbitrators.  At present, we believe the most 
plausible scenario is that our dataset reflects a slightly higher proportion of female 
arbitrators than the general population.  For the subset of ITA arbitrators, there were nine 
female subjects (13.4%) and fifty-eight men (86.6%).  This is facially distinguishable from 
recent research about ITA where, out of a pool of 248 arbitrators, there were nine women 
(3.6%) arbitrating cases generating a public award prior to 2012.  FRANCK, supra note 29; 
see also Franck, Empirically Evaluating, supra note 28, at 81 (identifying 5 women (3.5%) 
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non-OECD or non-High Income states, and HDI scores reflected that 
the median arbitrator was from one of the top twelve most developed 
states in the world.  These results suggest that:  (1) women’s presence 
in international arbitration has been relatively small; and (2) the 
proportion of developing world arbitrators has been relatively small. 
Although international arbitration involves transnational 
dispute settlement, the measures of central tendency supported 
narratives of a relatively non-diverse, homogenous group populating 
international arbitration.  Put another way, the descriptive data 
provide preliminary evidence suggesting that critiques that 
international arbitration lacks diversity are not stylized facts, but 
reflect empirically verified data.  Nevertheless, the data must be 
viewed in context.  While difficult to point to perfect diversity 
balance in elite positions, some communities meet diversity 
challenges better than others. 
B.  More Relative Success with Diversity 
There are a variety of professional contexts in which women 
and minorities have been represented well, albeit not perfectly.  
These areas involve the public sector, including domestic legislative 
and judicial branches, and some areas within the private sector. 
Several national legislatures exhibited better diversity 
indicators than international arbitration.  For instance, as of 2013, the 
countries where women had the largest proportions of elected 
representatives included Sweden (forty-seven percent), Iceland 
(forty-three percent), Argentina (forty-three percent), The 
Netherlands (forty-two percent), and Finland (forty-two percent).133  
According to Women in National Parliaments, in 2014, out of the 
149 countries surveyed, thirty-five countries (including Rwanda, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Serbia, and Burundi) had more than thirty percent 
female representation in their lower houses.134  Recent data indicated 
 
out of a pool of 145 arbitrators in pre-2007 awards).  If the third possibility is also correct, 
however, the sample may simply be over-representative of ITA, rather than ICA, women 
arbitrators.  This is a realistic possibility as, for our subset of ICA arbitrators, 45 (17.3%) 
were women. 
 133. GLOBAL DIVERSITY REPORT, supra note 130, at 10 (citing the United Nations, 
Women’s Indicators and Statistics Database). 
 134. World Classification, WOMEN IN NAT’L PARLIAMENTS (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm.  There were, however, thirty-two states where 
women in national legislatures accounted for less than eleven percent.  Id.  There was also 
wide variation in women’s representation in upper houses.  Some states, however, have 
quotas that promote gender diversity.  For example, the Government of Iraq and the Kurdish 
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that in OECD states the average proportion of female representation 
in parliaments was twenty-six percent; and while women in OECD 
states occupied over fifty percent of central government jobs, they 
held twenty-nine percent of elite management positions.135 
Research on national judiciaries offers instructive 
comparative information about diversity related to gender and race.  
Many—but not all—countries do better than international arbitration 
in having women in positions of key adjudicative responsibility.  
Several countries in the European Union have had success in 
equalizing the representation of women in their domestic 
judiciaries.136  Some countries have more than fifty percent women in 
their judiciaries including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, France, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Montenegro, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,137 and Israel.138  Yet even for countries 
that have experienced success in bringing women to the bench, many 
women were not in the most elite judicial positions.139 
 
Regional Government require quotas of twenty-five percent and thirty percent women 
respectively in their legislatures.  Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW), Concluding Observations on the Combined Fourth to Sixth Periodic 
Reports of Iraq, ¶¶ 33−34, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/IRQ/CO/4-6 (Mar. 10, 2014), available at 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW/
C/IRQ/CO/4-6&Lang=En [hereinafter Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination].   
 135. OECD, GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2013, at 122−27 (2013), available at 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/government-at-a-glance-2013_gov_glance-2013-
en.  
 136. See EUR. COMM’N FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE, COUNCIL OF EUR.,  EVALUATION 
REPORT ON EUROPEAN JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 147-50, 275-86 (2012) [hereinafter REP. ON EUR. 
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS) available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/ 
2012/Rapport_en.pdf (highlighting the achievements of several European Union judiciaries 
in having proportionate numbers of women in their judiciaries). 
 137. The percentages break down as follows:  Bosnia and Herzegovina:  sixty-three 
percent; Croatia:  sixty-seven percent; Czech Republic:  sixty-one percent; France:  sixty-
four percent; Greece:  sixty-five percent; Hungary:  sixty-nine percent; Latvia:  seventy-six 
percent; Montenegro:  fifty-five percent; Poland:  sixty-three percent; Romania:  seventy-
three percent; Slovakia:  sixty-three percent; Slovenia:  seventy-eight percent.  See id. at 
147–50, 275–81; see also GENDER AND JUDGING (Ulrike Schultz & Gisela Shaw eds., 2013) 
(exploring the experiences of women judges in nineteen different countries). 
 138. Eyal Katvan, The Entry and Integration of Women into Judicial Positions in Israel, 
in GENDER AND JUDGING, supra note 138, at 83. 
 139. See REP. ON EUR. JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 136, at 280 (observing that only 
six European states have more than fifty percent women in positions of power such as court 
presidents); OECD, supra note 135, at 124 (observing that women accounted for twenty-
nine percent of court presidencies of trial and intermediate appellate courts in OECD states).  
See generally GENDER AND JUDGING, supra note 137 (providing articles indicating that 
women’s experience on the bench is most dominant in the lower levels of the judiciary and 
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Some countries exhibit relative success in diversifying their 
judiciaries to make them more representative of the population.  
Women have comprised nearly fifty percent of law school classes in 
the United States since 1992, yet they currently only occupy 
approximately thirty-three percent of positions within the federal 
judiciary;140 and only roughly twenty-three percent of U.S. federal 
district court judges are minorities.141  Similarly, within the United 
States, state courts experienced a range of gender diversity; despite 
increases over time, recent data indicate women hold 29.2% of state 
judicial positions.142  Minorities held approximately 12.6% of overall 
state judicial positions in the United States.143  In Germany, women 
account for approximately 59% of law graduates;144 and in 2012, 
approximately 40% of national judges were women.145  Similarly, in 
 
not in more elite positions in courts of last resort).   
 140. Women in the Federal Judiciary:  Still a Long Way to Go, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW 
CTR. (June 27, 2014), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/women-federal-judiciary-still-long-
way-go-1; see also Jill D. Weingberg & Laura B. Nielsen, Examining Empathy:  
Discrimination, Experience and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 347–348 
(2012).  This is an improvement from 1977, when data suggested that women represented 
1.4% and minorities represented 4.4% of the federal judiciary.  Nancy Scherer, Diversifying 
the Federal Bench:  Is Universal Legitimacy for the U.S. Justice System Possible?, 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2011). 
 141. Weingberg & Nielsen, supra note 140, at 347; see also Gregory L. Acquaviva & 
John D. Castiglione, Judicial Diversity on State Supreme Courts, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1203, 1214, 1223 (2009). 
 142. The low was 5.6% in West Virginia and the high was 34.2% in Massachusetts. 
 143. Malia Reddick et al., Racial and Gender Diversity on State Courts:  An AJS Study, 
48 JUDGES J. 28 (2009).  The states with the lowest proportion of minority candidates were 
Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Wyoming (0%), with a high of 65.1% in 
Hawaii; the next states with the highest proportion of minority judges were Louisiana 
(20.6%) and New York (20.5%).  Id.  Research exploring women’s variation in 
representation in U.S. state courts also identified that the size of the court matters, and larger 
courts are more likely to have more women.  See Sally J. Kenny, Choosing Judges:  A 
Bumpy Road to Women’s Equality and a Long Way to Go, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1499, 
1520−21 (2012); see also Margaret Williams, Women’s Representation on State Trial and 
Appellate Courts, 88 SOC. SCI. Q. 1192, 1199 (2007). 
 144. Ausbildungsstatistik, BUNDESAMT FÜR JUSTIZ (Oct. 31, 2014), 
https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Justizstatistik/Juristenausbil
dung_2013.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 
 145. In Germany, thirty-one percent of the Federal Constitutional Court is comprised of 
women.  Zahl der Richter, Richterinnen, Staatanwälte, Staatanwältinnen und Vertreter, 
Vertreterinnen des öffentlichen Interesses in der Rechtspflege der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, BUNDESAMT FÜR JUSTIZ (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.bundesjustizamt. 
de/DE/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Justizstatistik/Gesamtstatistik.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
&v=5.  Scholars have identified, however, that women within the German judiciary 
“continue to be under-represented in leadership positions.”  Ulrike Schultz, “I was noticed 
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Canada, although women made up 51% of the Canadian population 
and 40% of practicing lawyers, only about 33% of judges were 
women.  Canada, however, has had even weaker representation of 
minorities, with minorities comprising only 2.3% of federally 
appointed judges.146  This suggests that, although these states did not 
exhibit perfect gender diversity, there were multiple instances where 
national judiciaries had proportionately better diversity than 
international arbitration.  Nevertheless, given the difficulty of many 
states in reaching representative levels of gender and race, achieving 
diversity often requires long-term investments. 
Other states’ judiciaries experienced gender imbalance, but 
had better success than international arbitration.  In 2010, women 
made up approximately 36% of the judiciary in Venezuela, 35% in 
Costa Rica, and 32% in Colombia.147  In Kenya, although women 
lacked representation on the court of appeal, approximately 35.5% of 
advocates were women and women made up about 30% of the bench 
in 2010.148  Even in Indonesia, in 2011, 23.4% of trial judges and 
15.4% of appellate judges were women.149 
Some national judiciaries, however, experience lower levels 
of diversity.150  In the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Justice 
reported that, in 2010, the levels of women judges rose to 20.6%, 
 
and I was asked . . .”  Women’s Careers in the Judiciary:  Results of an empirical study for 
the Ministry of Justice in Northrhine-Westfalia, Germany, in GENDER AND JUDGING, supra 
note 137, at 145. 
 146. Meredith Bacal, Diversity and the Judiciary:  Who is the Bench Representing 
Anyway?, THE COURT (July 5, 2012), http://www.thecourt.ca/2012/07/05/diversity-and-the-
judiciary-who-is-the-bench-representing-anyway/ (citing Ryerson Univ. Diversity Inst., 
Improving Representation in the Judiciary:  A Diversity Strategy (2012), available at 
http://www.ryerson.ca/content/dam/diversity/resources/Powerpoint%20-
%20Improving%20Representation%20in%20the%20Judiciary%20-%20June%2027.pdf). 
 147. Sital Kalantry, Women in Robes, 6 AMERICAS Q. 83, 84 (2012). 
 148. Winifred Kamau, Women Judges and Magistrates in Kenya:  Challenges, 
Opportunities and Contributions, in GENDER AND JUDGING, supra note 137, at 167, 170, 181. 
 149. Engy Abdelkader, To Judge or Not to Judge:  A Comparative Analysis of Islamic 
Jurisprudential Approaches to Female Judges in the Muslim World (Indonesia, Egypt, and 
Iran), 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 309, 347 (2014). 
 150. There may be other states with worse representation or states with no gender 
diversity.  Research on some Islamic law countries suggests this is the case.  See id. 
(observing that other Muslim countries lack diversity and some countries even forbid women 
from serving as judges); Ulirke Schultz & Gisela Shaw, Introduction:  Gender and Judging:  
Overview and Synthesis, in GENDER AND JUDGING, supra note 137, at 1, 8–9 (observing that 
Egypt, Kuwait, and the U.A.E. have female judges but noting that Saudi Arabia and Iran do 
not). 
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with only 4.8% minorities.151  In Brazil, in 2010, 18% of judges in its 
highest court were women, which was an increase from 0% in 
1999.152  In Malawi, approximately 17% of justices on the Malawi 
High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal were women.153  In Japan, 
the percentage of women in the judiciary was low (15%) but similar 
to the proportion of female Japanese lawyers (16%).154  By contrast 
to the success they experienced in their legislative representation, 
only 6% of the Iraqi judiciary were women.155 
The private sector also exhibited some success in putting 
women in elite corporate positions with arguably better results than 
international arbitration.  In the United States, there is at least one 
woman on ninety-seven percent of corporate boards.156  
Acknowledging that “there is a consistent deficit between the gender 
and ethnic diversity of mid-grade employees and their managerial 
counterparts within any given business,”157 an Oxford Economics 
Report observed that countries with the “highest female 
representation on corporate boards [were] Norway (thirty-six 
percent), followed by Philippines (twenty-three percent), Sweden 
(twenty-three percent), Latvia (twenty-two percent) and Slovakia 
(twenty-two percent).”158 
 
 151. Mary L. Clark, Judicial Retirement and Return to Practice, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 
841, 873 n.216 (2011).  Recent data demonstrate low levels of women’s representation as, in 
2013, 24.3% of judges were women and 4.8% were black or ethnic minorities.  Diversity 
Statistics and General Overview Breakdown 2013, CTS. & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY (July 11, 
2013), https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/ publications/diversity-statistics-and-general-overview-
2013 (click on “Tribunals Diversity Breakdown 2012–13”). 
 152. Kalantry, supra note 147, at 83. 
 153. Siri Gloppen & Fedelis E. Kanyongolo, Courts and the Poor in Malawi:  Economic 
Marginalization, Vulnerability and the Law, 5 INT’L J. CONST. L. 258, 289 (2007). 
 154. David T. Johnson, Japan’s Prosecution System, 41 CRIME & JUST. 35, 49 n.8 
(2012). 
 155. See CEDAW, supra note 134, ¶¶ 33−34. 
 156. Nizan Geslevich Packin, It’s (Not) All About the Money:  Using Behavioral 
Economics to Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 15 U. PA. J. 
BUS. L. 419, 454 n.184 (2013).  However, women only make up sixteen percent of the total 
number of directors and the average number of women on corporate boards is two.  Id. 
 157. GLOBAL DIVERSITY REPORT, supra note 130, at 30. 
 158. Id. at 8; see also Kimberly Gladman, 2013 Women on Boards Survey, HARV. L. 
SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 20, 2013), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/05/20/2013-women-on-boards-survey (noting 
that “63% [of companies] have at least one female director” and “women make up a higher 
percentage of directors in developed markets”); EUR. COMM’N, REPORT ON WOMEN AND MEN 
IN LEADERSHIP POSITIONS AND GENDER EQUALITY STRATEGY MID-TERM REVIEW (Oct. 14, 
2013), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-882_en.htm (identifying 
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C.  Less Relative Success with Diversity 
International arbitration’s diversity levels may not be unusual.  
First, as identified earlier, some national courts had little diversity.  
Second, empirical literature reflects that men from developed states 
have primarily populated international courts and tribunals. 
In terms of gender diversity, one study estimated women 
accounted for only about five percent of appointments in 
international courts and tribunals.159  Grossman’s more 
comprehensive study identified slightly higher proportions in 2012.  
With only one outlier,160 women historically comprised 
approximately twenty percent of international courts and tribunals.  
Grossman’s 2012 article identified that women made up nineteen 
percent of the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body; women 
comprised eighteen percent of judges on the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and the European Court of Human Rights; the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights had fifteen percent 
women; the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) had 
thirteen percent; the European Court of Justice had seven percent; the 
International Court of Justice had three percent; and the International 
 
that within the E.U. women accounted for 16.6%, or one in six, board members of the largest 
publicly listed company, including Finland (29.1%) and Latvia (29%), closely followed by 
France (26.8%) and Sweden (26.5%)).  This is, however, not necessarily a natural 
phenomenon as several European countries have gender quotas for corporate boards.  See 
generally FIRMS, BOARDS AND GENDER QUOTAS:  COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (Fredrik 
Englestad & Mari Teigen eds., 2012). But see Justice: Board Members, EUR. COMM’N (Jan. 
20, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/gender-decision-making/database/ 
business-finance/supervisory-board-board-directors/index_en.htm (identifying that, for the 
European Union, twenty percent of board members of the largest publicly listed companies 
were women). 
 159. See Chiara Giorgetti, Who Decides Who Decides in International Investment 
Arbitration, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 431, 459 n.99 (2014) (citing LCHR’s Chart Showing 
Gender and Regional Balance in Elections to International Courts and Tribunals, LAWYERS 
COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
pdf/judges_gender_region_040303.pdf (last visited May 16, 2015)). 
 160. The International Criminal Court was the one exception, with forty-four percent 
women.  Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 112, at 652−54, 679–81.  Notably, the 
Rome Statute requires equitable geographical and gender representation.  Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court art. 36(8), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 38544, available at 
http://legal.un.org/icc/statute/romefra.htm; but see Current Judges, INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/ 
chambers/the%20judges/Pages/judges.aspx (last visited May 27, 2015) (identifying that, in 
2015, six of seventeen judges of the International Criminal Court are women but that a 
woman is the President of the Court). 
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Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) had never had a woman as a 
permanent judge at the time of the research, though it now has one.161 
Beyond Grossman’s historical research, the Iran-U.S. Claims 
Tribunal (IUSCT) at The Hague has nine members, and currently 
only one is a woman.162  In 2013, our research only identified one 
other woman—Gabrielle Kirk McDonald—serving on the IUSCT 
since its inception in 1981.  Only one of the seven members of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body,163 and only one 
member of the twenty-member ITLOS164 was a woman.  The IACHR 
currently has no women judges.165  We identified only one woman 
who served as a commissioner on the United Nations Claims 
Commission (UNCC).166 
Research by Cecily Rose and Shashank Kumar confirms a 
lack of female counsel in public international law.  They identified 
that for all lawyers involved in contentious cases at the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), female counsel only represented 11.2% of all 
advocates (n=23), and only spoke 7.4% of the total time in ICJ 
proceedings.167  For the subset of lawyers who were repeat ICJ 
counsel, women only represented 6.3% (n=4) of the pool, and 
women’s speaking time decreased to 2.9%.168  One contrast was that, 
in advisory proceedings, female advocates accounted for 19% of the 
population and 18% of total speaking time, but these women tended 
 
 161. Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 112, at 679–80; see also infra note 164. 
 162. See IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, Arbitrators, https://www.iusct.net/Pages/Public/ 
A-Arbitrators.aspx (last visited May 16, 2015) (listing Rosemary Barkett as the only female 
member on the Tribunal). Gabrielle Kirk, a U.S. appointee, was the only other woman. 
 163. Yuejiao Zhang is the current Chinese appointee.  Former female Appellate Body 
members include Merit Janow (U.S.), Jennifer Hillman (U.S.) and Lilia Bautista 
(Philippines).  Biography, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/ab_members_bio_e.htm (last visited May 16, 2015). 
 164. See Grossman, supra note 110, at Table 1; see also Members, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR 
THE LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=96 (last visited May 16, 2015) 
(listing Elsa Kelly as the only female on the Tribunal). 
 165. Grossman, supra note 110, at Table 2. 
 166. Professor Dr. Nayla Comair-Obeid was the sole female Commissioner.  See Report 
and Recommendations Made by the Panel of Comm’rs Concerning the Fourth Instalment of 
Palestinian “Late Claims” for Damages Up to USD 100,000 (Category “C” Claims), U.N. 
Comp. Comm’n Governing Council, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2005/3 (Mar. 10, 2005), available 
at http://www.uncc.ch/sites/default/files/attachments/documents/r2005-03.pdf (showing a 
signature by “N. Comair-Obeid”). 
 167. Kumar & Rose, supra note 60, at 904. 
 168. Id. at 904. 
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to be government officials and state diplomats,169 suggesting that 
having a healthy proportion of women in key domestic positions 
could generate a trickle-down effect on diversity in international law. 
International courts and tribunals also experience diversity 
challenges related to nationality and development.  One study 
commented on “the extent of the Western monopoly of international 
legal practice at the ICJ” and argued that international law “is not as 
international as its name implies.”170  Gaubatz and MacArthur 
questioned the legitimacy of the ICJ given the lack of diversity in the 
judiciary and counsel.  For judges, their 2002 data indicated that all 
seven of the OECD judges received their education entirely in OECD 
states, and all but one of the non-OECD judges received the majority 
of their legal education in OECD states.171  Although the ICJ has 
arguably done better in recent history, 172 the data were in contrast to 
the Statute of the ICJ which requires electors to “bear in mind not 
only that the persons to be elected should individually possess the 
qualifications required, but also that in the body as a whole the 
representation of the main forms of civilization and of the principal 
legal systems of the world should be assured.”173 
 
 169. Id. at 914. 
 170. Gaubatz & MacArthur, supra note 97, at 240–41. 
 171. Id. at 261−63. 
 172. As of July 2014, the judges of the ICJ were nationals of Brazil, China, France, 
India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Russia, Slovakia, Somalia, Uganda, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom.  See Current Members, INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&p2=2&p3=1 (last visited July 31, 2014). 
 173. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 9, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/?p1=4&p2=2.  The ITLOS has a similar 
mandate requiring “representation of the principal legal systems of the world and equitable 
geographical distribution . . . .”  It also states that “[t]here shall be no fewer than three 
members from each geographical group as established by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations.”  Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea arts. 2(2), 3(2), 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 561, available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_ 
agreements/texts/unclos/annex6.htm.  Notably, the ITLOS does not mandate gender 
representation.  Compare id., with supra note 160 and accompanying text (requiring gender 
and geographical balance at the International Criminal Court).  Although the ITLOS has low 
gender representation it arguably does better on the matrix of nationality.  As of July 2014, 
the judges of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea were nationals of Algeria, 
Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Cape Verde, China, France, Germany, Grenada, India, Japan, 
Lebanon, Malta, Poland, South Korea, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ukraine.  See 
Members, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/en/the-
tribunal/members/ (last visited July 31, 2014); see also Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation 
and Power in International Organization:  The Operational Constitution and its Critics, 103 
AM. J. INT’L L. 209, 220–24 (2009) (suggesting that mandates requiring diversity in 
international law are limited, but there are hortatory suggestions for representation and 
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Gaubatz and MacArthur also identified a dearth of 
developing-world advocates.174  New research by Rose and Kumar 
replicates those earlier findings with more recent data.  From 
1999−2012, the majority of the 205 different lawyers appearing 
before the ICJ were from the developed world.  Specifically, 72.2% 
were nationals of OECD states, 71.5% were from states the World 
Bank classified as High Income, and 72.9% were from states with 
HDI scores that put them in the category of “very high human 
development”; for counsel who were repeat players at the ICJ, the 
balance was even more skewed towards representation by lawyers 
from developed states.175 
The private sector also has its challenges with diversity.  
When power is concentrated into a single position, gender balance is 
not as prevalent.  For example, the Fortune 500 announced in 2014 
that women exhibited their best showing in history by comprising 
4.8% of CEOs in the top 500 corporations in the United States.176  In 
contrast, when membership is more diffuse—such as when there are 
multiple positions on a corporate board—there is broader female 
representation, as 63% of top corporations have at least one female 
board member.177  This latter phenomenon might reflect the tendency 
for larger structures to generate greater opportunities for diversity.  
 
balance). 
 174. Gaubatz & MacArthur, supra note 97, at 247, 251−53. 
 175. Kumar & Rose, supra note 60, at 902–06; but see TERRIS ET AL., supra note 2, at 
223 (concluding that “[t]here was once a time when the ‘invisible college’ of international 
judges consisted of a small band of men, principally Europeans, clustered tightly in The 
Hague” but observing that “[t]oday’s more extensive network has much more diversity in 
terms of geography, race, and gender”).  
 176. Caroline Fairchild, Number of Fortune 500 Women CEOs Reaches Historic High, 
FORTUNE (June 3, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/06/03/number-of-fortune-500-
women-ceos-reaches-historic-high/.  The European Union exhibited similar difficulties with 
less than three percent of the largest listed companies having a female CEO.  EURO. 
COMM’N, GENDER BALANCE ON CORPORATE BOARDS:  EUROPE IS CRACKING THE GLASS 
CEILING 2 (Mar. 2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/documents/140303_factsheet_wob_en.pdf. 
 177. Gladman, supra note 158 (“63% [of companies] have at least one female director, 
and 13% have at least three women”).  Even with this success, the popular press notes that 
those women CEOs are still likely to be paid less than their male counterparts and more 
likely to be fired.  See Edward Helmore, The Facts Show It:  Female CEOs are More Likely 
Than Men to be Fired, GUARDIAN, May 17, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ 
may/17/female-ceos-more-likely-than-men-to-be-fired; Claire Cain Miller, An Elusive 
Jackpot:  Riches Come to Women as C.E.O.s, but Few Get There, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/08/business/riches-come-to-women-as-ceos-but-few-get-
there.html?_r=1 (observing that women CEOs make $1.6 million less than male 
counterparts). 
480 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW [53:429 
Researchers observed this phenomenon in U.S. state courts whereby 
larger state courts exhibited larger proportions of women.178 
Meanwhile, law firms have also struggled with diversity.  In 
2014, Linklaters reported that, globally, only 17% of its partners 
were female, with a high of 28% female partners in Asia and a low of 
7% female partners in Europe; 88.37% of U.S. partners were 
Caucasian.179  Linklaters’ experience is not unique given the lack of 
women partners in U.S. and U.K. law firms.180  These examples raise 
the possibility that the diversity data in arbitration reflect an 
international pipeline problem, as not all countries have the same 
level of women or minority lawyers (to say nothing of women and 
minority lawyers who are interested in international arbitration).181 
It is worth observing that—by comparison to many national 
judiciaries and legislatures—international courts and tribunals 
experience challenges about their representativeness, generating 
concerns about their institutional legitimacy.  The question remains 
as to whether the international arbitration community wishes to be a 
leader in the diversity amongst the international law community or is 
content with its current position. 
D.  Self-Reflection on the “Invisible College’s” Perceived Diversity Levels 
Regardless of the appropriate comparative baseline for 
international arbitration, the data reflected that there were concerns 
about diversity challenges within the international arbitration 
community.182  To explore issues about diversity from a broad 
 
 178. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 179. LINKLATERS, DIVERSITY STATISTICS:  2014, at 1, 6 (2014), http://www.linklaters. 
com/Responsibility/Pages/Diversity.aspx. 
 180. See AM. BAR ASS’N, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAW 2 (Feb. 2013), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_glance 
_statistics_feb2013.authcheckdam.pdf (indicating that women make up 19.9% of partners in 
the United States); Joanne Harris, Diversity Efforts Fail to Pay Off at Top End of Profession, 
LAW. (Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://www.thelawyer.com/analysis/the-lawyer-
management/management-news/diversity-efforts-fail-to-pay-off-at-top-end-of-profession 
/3008182.article (observing that the Lawyer’s UK 200 showed that women made up 18.6% 
of all partners). 
 181.  See also Sally J. Kenny, Which Judicial Selection Systems Generate the Most 
Women Judges?  Lessons from the United States, in GENDER AND JUDGING, supra note 137, 
at 461, 462–69 (identifying various explanations for poor female representation in 
judiciaries). 
 182. Arbitration’s diversity concerns are somewhat reminiscent of commentary about 
the glass ceiling in transitioning to the judiciary.  See Kalantry, supra note 147, at 85 
(“Across the globe, women judges report that an ‘old boys’ club’ mentality surround[s] 
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perspective, we asked a wide-ranging question.  Specifically, we 
asked subjects to respond to the following statement:  “International 
arbitration has diversity challenges related to gender, nationality, or 
age.”183  Subjects then ranked their answer using a 1−5 numerical 
scale, with “1” being “strongly disagree,” “3” being “neither agree 
nor disagree,” and “5” being “strongly agree.”184 
Overall, the responses reflected that ICCA subjects self-
identified diversity issues in international arbitration.  For the 513 
ICCA subjects responding to the question, both the most frequent 
answer and median answer was “4”,185 indicating that subjects 
somewhat agreed that there are diversity challenges in international 
arbitration related to gender, nationality or age.186 
 
Table 6:  Percentages and Frequency of Responses of all ICCA Subjects in 
Response to Question about whether International Arbitration has Diversity 
Issues related to Gender, Nationality, or Age. 
 
Response Type Response 
Percentage 
Frequency 
1   Strongly Disagree     6.2   32 
2   Somewhat Disagree     9.2   47 
3   Neither Agree nor Disagree   27.1 139 
4   Somewhat Agree   30.8 159 
5   Strongly Agree   26.7 137 








judicial appointment [and] poses a crucial barrier to entry . . . .”). 
 183. See infra Annex 1. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Thirty-five subjects failed to respond to this question.  The mean response was 3.63 
(SD=1.153). 
 186. See Table 6.  For the subset of ICCA subjects who had served as counsel or 
arbitrator, the 445 subjects had nearly identical response patterns, with 6.3% strongly 
disagreeing (n=28), 10.3% somewhat disagreeing (n=46), 26.5% neither agreeing nor 
disagreeing (n=118), (4) 30.1% somewhat agreeing (n=134), and (5) 26.7% strongly 
agreeing (n=119) about international arbitration experiencing diversity concerns. 
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We analyzed whether there were meaningful differences in 
how men and women evaluated diversity-related concerns.  A t-test 
revealed a meaningful gender difference in the mean response to the 
diversity question (t(506)=-6.189; p<.001; r=.27; n=508).187  For 
male subjects, the mean score was 3.46 (SD=1.13; n=385).  In 
contrast, for female subjects the mean score was 4.17 (SD=1.05; 
n=123), indicating that the majority of women believed there was a 
problem and identified that they “somewhat agreed” to “strongly 
agreed” with the possibility of diversity challenges related to gender, 
nationality, or age.  In addition, the r-value reflected a medium-sized 
difference, suggesting the gender variation was non-trivial. 
Figure 1 reflects that men were more likely than women to 
either disagree with the idea that there are diversity challenges or not 
take a position on diversity challenges.  By contrast, women were 
more likely than men to “strongly agree” that international arbitration 
experiences diversity challenges, with fifty percent of all women 
selecting that response. 
 
Figure 1:  Percentage of all ICCA Subjects identifying diversity challenges as 
a function of subject gender 
 
 
We computed a correlation coefficient to evaluate a possible 
linear relationship between age and subject response.  The results 
demonstrated a significant relationship between subject age and 
 
 187.  The effect was also significant for the subset of ICCA participants who were 
counsel and/or arbitrators (t(443)=-5.736; p<.001; r=.26; n=445). 
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subject response (r(497)=-.17; p<.001).  The direction of the 
relationship was such that, as subject age increased, subjects were 
less likely to identify a diversity problem in international arbitration.  
In contrast, as subject age decreased, subjects were more likely to 
identify a diversity problem in international arbitration. 
The results evaluating the relationship between a subject’s 
development status and response were more mixed.  While one might 
hypothesize that, much like gender and age where women and 
younger practitioners were more sensitized to issues of diversity, this 
was not the case for subjects’ development status.  The results, 
however, suggested that subjects’ development status was either 
irrelevant or operated in the opposite direction of that stated 
hypothesis. 
We also analyzed subjects’ primary nationality in three ways, 
namely:  (1) OECD membership; (2) World Bank classification; and 
(3) HDI classification.  The results generated a puzzle, as two 
measures failed to identify a reliable link between development status 
and responses to the diversity question, but one measure of 
development status revealed an unexpected result. 
First, an ANOVA188 was unable to identify a meaningful 
group difference in response to the diversity question for subjects’ 
World Bank status (F(3,480)=1.802; p=.15; r=.11; n=484).  Follow-
up analyses using a conservative test also failed to identify any 
significant pairwise comparisons.  A more liberal follow-up test, 
however, identified a latent relationship where nationals of upper-
middle income states expressed lower levels of concerns about 
diversity, whereas nationals of High Income states expressed higher 
level of concerns about diversity. 
Second, correlation coefficients189 analyzed response 
variations to the diversity question and the continuous variable of 
subject’s HDI (r(484)=.07; p=.15).  The facial, but non-significant, 
trend was that subjects who were nationals of more developed states 
expressed greater concern about lack of diversity.  As any latent 
effect was less than statistically small (r<.10), there is a theoretical 
but unlikely risk of insufficient power.190  In any event, a priori 
 
 188. The one-way ANOVA was necessary to analyze variation in the diversity question 
on the basis of the four-category variable of subjects’ World Bank development status.  See 
URDAN, supra note 71, at 105−10. 
 189. A Pearson’s Product Moment Correlation Co-efficient explores linear relationships 
between two continuous variables.  Id. at 79−83. 
 190. See JACOB COHEN ET AL., STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL 
SCIENCES 3–6, 115 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining a priori power analyses); Franck, Development 
and Outcomes, supra note 28, at 461 n.132 (applying Cohen’s power analysis to arbitration).  
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power analyses reflect that it is impossible to reliably conclude the 
lack of an effect until there is data from over 781 subjects; further 
research is therefore required. 
Third, a t-test191 revealed a meaningful difference in the mean 
response to the diversity question (t(482)=-2.255; p=.03; r=.10; 
n=484) for OECD and non-OECD subjects.  The difference was in an 
unexpected direction.  Subjects from OECD countries were more 
likely to identify diversity issues (M=3.69; SD=1.14; n=362).  In 
contrast, subjects from non-OECD countries were less likely to 
identify diversity challenges (M=3.42; SD=1.16; n=112).  The effect 
size was statistically small (r=.10), which indicates that the reliably 
present effect was not large.192  Figure 2 reflects that non-OECD 
nationals were slightly more likely than OECD nationals to either 
disagree with the idea that there are diversity challenges or not take a 
position.  By contrast, OECD nationals were more likely than non-
OECD nationals to either somewhat or “strongly agree” that 
international arbitration experiences diversity challenges. 
 
 
The post hoc power of an analysis is determined using power tables to estimate the 
probability of committing a Type II error (Type II error rate = 1 – power).  As the power of 
the analysis was small (r ≤ .10 and n= 144), there is a seventy to eighty percent risk of 
having incorrectly identified no relationship.  When there is less than a “small” non-
significant effect, social science literature does not generally perceive a power problem. 
 191. As OECD status is a two-level variable, a t-test is necessary.  See URDAN, supra 
note 71, at 93. 
 192. The effect was also significant and small for the subset of ICCA subjects who were 
counsel and/or arbitrators (t(482)=-2.255; p=.03; r=.10; n=484). 
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Figure 2:  Percentage of all ICCA subjects identifying diversity challenges as a 
function of subject’s OECD status 
 
 
In these circumstances, it is possible that non-OECD 
nationals perceived international arbitration as comparatively better 
at promoting diversity and thereby evaluated the status quo as less 
problematic.  It may also reflect that individuals from developing 
countries may have different approaches to social norms related to 
diversity.193  Irrespective of potential competing causal explanations, 
there is value in identifying the phenomenon.  The observation also 
suggests it is appropriate to acknowledge addressing diversity 
concerns transnationally requires a nuanced approach, where 
approaches to diversity that are appropriate in a national context may 
not apply transnationally. 
Overall, the international arbitration community indicated that 
there were concerns on issues of diversity related to gender, 
nationality, or age.  Women and younger participants reliably 
identified the difference more distinctly.  Although the results were 
mixed, there was some evidence suggesting that the arbitration 
community from the developed world may perceive greater concerns 
 
 193. See, e.g., Ronald Inglehart & Wayne E. Baker, Modernization, Culture Change, 
and the Persistence of Traditional Values, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 1 (2000) (identifying how 
cultural values can vary according to economic development levels); Yiming Jing & Michael 
Harris Bond, Linking a Citizen’s Trust of Regulatory Institutions and Out-groups to 
Tolerance for Morally Questionable Practices:  The Role of National Context for Child 
Socialization (forthcoming) (copy on file with authors) (discussing cultural variations to 
sensitive social issues and exploring variations related to economic development). 
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than developing world counterparts.  As demonstrated with subjects’ 
actual experiences with diversity, these perceptions may require 
reassessment.194 
V.  EXPERIENCED DIVERSITY PROBLEMS 
Perception can be different than reality.  Scholarship in 
cognitive psychology reflects that assessments can be influenced by 
heuristics that make certain experiences seem more prevalent or 
generate selective perception.195  For this reason, we tested 
demographic data and perceptions against reported experiences in 
international arbitration. 
This subsection first analyzes how frequently those acting as 
arbitrators receive appointments, both as a function of gender and 
development status.  It then explores counsels’ and arbitrators’ 
experience with diverse appointments.  To minimize response bias, 
we asked about subjects’ experiences with international arbitration in 
a portion of the Survey that was separate from the demographic 
questions and the survey item about diversity.  Specifically, we asked 
questions to identify—in their experience as arbitrator and counsel—
how frequently subjects had worked with tribunals comprised of at 
least one woman and/or tribunals with at least one developing 
country arbitrator.196 
A.  Gender and Development:  Variations in Frequency of Appointments 
Tables 1 and 2 reflected that the average number of 
appointments per arbitrator for all types of arbitration was thirty-five; 
and given the variation in the number of appointments, the median 
number of total arbitration appointments per arbitrator (both in ICA 
and ITA) was ten.  The question remained whether the scope of those 
appointments varied according to arbitrators’ gender or development 
status.  For women, it was not possible to identify a meaningful 
 
 194. The data reflected a reliable pattern whereby developing world arbitrators 
experienced lower numbers of appointments than their developed world counterparts, but 
were also likely to sit with other developing world arbitrators.  We were unable to identify a 
meaningful difference between the appointment levels of men and women. 
 195. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE GORILLA:  HOW 
OUR INTUITIONS DECEIVE US (2010); FRANCK, supra note 29, at ch. 2. 
 196. Methodological constraints related to timing and formatting prevented us from 
asking questions beyond those identified in Annex 1.  Further research could more precisely 
explore subjects’ experiences. 
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difference in number of arbitral appointments; but for nationals of 
developing countries, it was possible to identify a meaningful 
difference in the number of appointments. 
For gender, we conducted two types of tests to assess 
meaningful differences between men and women in the number of 
arbitration appointments.  First, a Mann-Whitney two-sample U-
test197 failed to reveal a statistically significant difference in the 
median number of appointments (U=4564.5; p=.39).  The median 
number of appointments for women was nine (IQR=3-22);198 and the 
median for men was ten and a half (IQR=3-40).199  When analyzing 
subsets of ICA and ITA arbitrators, we were also unable to find a 
reliable gender difference in appointment levels.200 
For development status, we conducted multiple tests—using 
different definitions of development status—to explore potential 
differences in the appointment levels of developed and developing 
world arbitrators.201  First, a Mann-Whitney U-test202 identified a 
reliable difference in appointments between OECD and non-OECD 
nationals (U=3247.5; p<.01) such that OECD nationals reliably 
obtained more appointments.  While the median number of 
appointments for arbitrators from non-OECD countries was 5 
(IQR=2-19.25), the median number of appointments for arbitrators 
from OECD countries was 11.5 (IQR 4-40).  Second, a Kruskal-
 
 197. When exploring group differences in a binary variable (like gender), it is 
appropriate to use a Mann-Whitney test when means are skewed.  GREGORY W. CORDER & 
DALE I. FOREMAN, NONPARAMETRIC STATISTICS FOR NON-STATISTICIANS:  A STEP-BY-STEP 
APPROACH (2009); URDAN, supra note 71, at 96, 161. 
 198. The range of an IQR reflects the quartile breakdown.  In this case the twenty-fifth 
quartile is three; the median was nine; and the seventy-fifth percentile was twenty-two.  For 
IQR=3–22, the three reflects the twenty-fifth quartile and the twenty-two reflects the 
seventy-fifth quartile. 
 199. Out of an abundance of caution, even though the data was skewed, we also used a 
t-test to explore potential gender differences in appointment levels.  The test also failed to 
reveal any mean difference in appointment levels for men and women (t(260)=0.293; p=.77; 
r=.02; n=262).  The mean number of appointments for women was thirty-two (SD=79.39; 
n=46), and the mean number of appointments for men was thirty-five (SD=61; n=216). 
 200. Mann-Whitney tests were unable to detect a reliable link between gender and 
arbitration appointments in either ICA (U=4511.5; p=.48) or ITA (U=3020.5; p=.23).  
 201. Different tests were necessary because of the different variable types.  A Mann-
Whitney test compares differences between two groups and a continuous variable; a 
Kruskal-Wallis test compares differences between multiple groups and a continuous 
variable; and correlations are used when there are two continuous variables, like HDI status 
and number of appointments. 
 202. See supra note 197 (noting Mann-Whitney tests are appropriate for binary 
variables, like OECD status). 
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Wallis test203 identified a reliable difference between World Bank 
classifications of an arbitrator’s home state (χ2=12.091; p<.01; r=.22; 
n=250) such that developing world arbitrators obtained fewer 
appointments than their developed country colleagues.  Specifically, 
the median number of appointments for an arbitrator from a High 
Income state was 11 (IQR=4-40); the median number of 
appointments for arbitrators from an Upper-middle Income state was 
8 (IQR=2-25); and the median number of appointments for 
arbitrators from a Lower-middle Income state was 2 (IQR=1-8).  
There were no arbitrators from Low Income states.  Third, a 
correlation coefficient204 identified a reliable difference between HDI 
classifications of an arbitrator’s home state and the number of 
appointments (r(250)=.13; p=.04).  The direction was such that, the 
more developed the home state, the greater number of appointments; 
and the less developed the arbitrator’s home state, the fewer the 
number of appointments. 
Overall, the results suggested that, for women, once they 
become arbitrators by having at least one appointment, the frequency 
of appointments was roughly equivalent to those of men.  By 
contrast, for developing world arbitrators, the number of their 
appointments was statistically lower than their developed world 
counterparts; and the effect sizes suggest development status 
generates a small-to-medium sized effect on the number of reported 
arbitral appointments. 
This generates a puzzle.  It means that women were more 
likely to perceive real diversity challenges; and the difficulty was 
apparent when examining the small number of women acting as 
arbitrators (particularly when compared to women in positions of 
authority in national courts and legislatures).  Nevertheless, once 
women joined the arbitrator pool, they obtained roughly equivalent 
levels of appointments.  The diversity challenge for women appears 
to relate to obtaining initial access or breaking through the “glass 
ceiling.”  For developing world arbitrators, it means they were less 
likely to perceive diversity challenges, even though there were small 
numbers of developing world arbitrators and they received fewer 
appointments.  Part of the explanation may be the contrast with the 
arguably worse representation of developing world adjudicators in 
international courts and tribunals, which is buttressed by the number 
 
 203. A Kruskal-Wallis test analyzes non-normal continuous variables (like appointment 
levels) and group differences in a multi-categorical variable (like World Bank 
classifications).  CORDER & FOREMAN, supra note 196; URDAN, supra note 71, at 161. 
 204. See supra notes 189, 201 and accompanying text (noting correlations are 
appropriate for continuous variables). 
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of tribunals where developing world arbitrators sat with other 
developing world arbitrators.  Nevertheless, in contrast to the 
diversity challenges experienced by women, it suggests that 
developing world arbitrators may require a different solution to 
achieve broader representation in the pool of arbitrators. 
B.  Arbitrators’ Experiences with Diversity 
We asked subjects whether, in their experience as arbitrators, 
they had served on a tribunal with a woman (or another woman).  We 
then invited subjects to respond by ticking a box indicating that they 
had:  (1) never sat on a tribunal with a woman; (2) they had sat on 
such a tribunal one to five times; (3) they had sat on such a tribunal 
six to ten times; or (4) they had sat on a tribunal with a woman more 
than ten times.205 
First, we adjusted responses to reflect women’s self-reported 
arbitral appointments; there were many instances where women who 
had served on tribunals but failed to identify their own service as 
arbitrators in their answers.206  This made it possible to correct for 
potential under-reporting.  The mode and median response was 2, 
reflecting that most arbitrators experienced at least 1 to 5 arbitrations 
containing at least one woman.  Table 7 provides a frequency 
breakdown of subject responses, which indicate a significant 
proportion of arbitrators reported they had “never” been on a tribunal 
with a woman and more than 75% of arbitrators indicated the 
maximum number of times they had sat on a tribunal with a female 
co-arbitrator was 5.  A primary basis for the presence of a female 
arbitrator on a tribunal resulted from ensuring that women’s own 
appointment experiences were reflected in the analysis.207 
 
 
 205. See infra Annex 1. 
 206. For example, if a woman had indicated that she had “never” (=1) sat on a tribunal 
with a woman, but she sat on twenty cases, the response was re-coded as “more than ten 
times” (=4) to reflect her own appointments. 
 207. Without adjusting for a woman’s own appointments, there was nearly a dead heat 
between subjects answering they had “never” or only “1–5 times” sat with a woman.  Those 
two categories garnered nearly eighty-four percent of all responses.  Only 7.8% of subjects 
indicated they had sat with a woman more than ten times.  The only reason for the variation 
between those responses and the responses reported in Table 7 was that, for those subjects 
who were female arbitrators, it was necessary to ensure that their own experience as 
arbitrators were included in the systemic responses.  
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Table 7:  Percentages and Frequency of Responses of ICCA Subjects Serving 
as Arbitrators, Describing the Frequency of Having at Least One Woman on a 
Tribunal (including Women’s Self-Reported Appointments) 
 
Response Type Response 
Percentage 
Frequency 
No Tribunal with a Woman   32.2   83 
1-5 Tribunals with a Woman   43.4 112 
6-10 Tribunals with a Woman     8.9   23 








Second, using the subset of 46 female arbitrators, we 
identified how many times women worked on tribunals containing 
two or more women.  The results suggested that, more often than not, 
these women were the only women on their tribunals.  Specifically, 
52.2% (n=24) indicated they had never sat with another woman; 37% 
(n=17) indicated they had sat with another woman 1-5 times; and 
1.5% (n=4) indicated they had sat with another woman between 6-10 
times.  Only one female arbitrator indicated that she had been 
empaneled with another woman on more than ten occasions.  Since 
many international arbitration tribunals consist of three members, the 
rarity for multiple women to serve as co-arbitrators was noteworthy. 
Turning to nationality and variation in development 
background, we asked whether arbitrators had served on tribunals 
with an arbitrator from a developing country.208  We then invited 
subjects to respond by ticking a box indicating that they had:  (1) 
never sat on such a tribunal; (2) sat on such a tribunal one to five 
times; (3) sat on such a tribunal six to ten times; or (4) sat on a 
tribunal with a developing world arbitrator more than ten times.209  
We cross-checked a subject’s own development status to ensure that 
their responses did not ignore their own experience in being 
appointed to tribunals, although we recognize that respondents could 
encounter difficulties in their self-definitions of development status.  
We classified arbitrators’ development status using OECD, World 
 
 208. As identified earlier, there is no uniform definition of a “developing” nation.  
Subjects answering this question may have experienced difficulties when reflecting on their 
own experiences and generated non-uniform responses.  Survey responses were, however, 
buttressed by the demographic data showing similar homogeneities. 
 209. See infra Annex 1. 
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Bank, and HDI status.  Results were nearly identical irrespective of 
how the subjects’ development status was coded.210  Table 8 provides 
a frequency distribution of the OECD status results where we ensured 
that, for nationals of non-OECD states, they did not under-represent 
their experiences with developing world arbitrators by ignoring their 
own experience as an arbitrator. 
 
Table 8:  Percentages and Frequency of Responses of ICCA Subjects Serving 
as Arbitrators, Describing the Frequency of Having at Least One Developing 
World Arbitrator on a Tribunal (including Subjects’ Self-Reported 
Appointments using their OECD Status) 
 
Response Type Response 
Percentage 
Frequency 
No Tribunal with a Developing World 
Arbitrator 
40.2 102 
1-5 Tribunals with a Developing 
World Arbitrator 
38.6   98 
6-10 tribunals with a Developing 
World Arbitrator 
  9.8   25 
10+ tribunals with a Developing 
World Arbitrator 








Like the results for arbitrators experiencing the presence of a 
single woman, nearly one-half of arbitrators had never had an 
opportunity to collaborate with a developing world arbitrator on a 
tribunal.  Looking to the mean appointments of 35 and median of 10, 
the data suggests that, at best, a developing world arbitrator sat on 
one half to perhaps one third of tribunals.  There were fourteen 
 
 210. When analyzing subjects using the World Bank classification of their home state 
(and classifying non-High Income arbitrators as “developing world” arbitrators):  (1) 40.2% 
(n=102) had never sat with a developing country arbitrator; (2) 38.6% (n=98) had sat with 
one developing world arbitrator 1–5 times; (3) 9.8% (n=25) had sat with a developing world 
arbitrator 6–10 times; and (4) 11.4% (n=29) had sat with a developing world arbitration 
eleven or more times.  When subjects were analyzed using their home state’s HDI score (and 
classifying arbitrators as “developing” when they were not in the top thirty most developed 
states):  (1) 39.0% (n=99) had never sat with a developing country arbitrator; (2) 39.4% 
(n=100) had sat with one developing world arbitrator 1–5 times; (3) 9.8% (n=25) had sat 
with a developing world arbitrator 6–10 times; and (4) 11.8% (n=30) had sat with a 
developing world arbitration eleven or more times. 
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subjects who indicated that they had sat on 100+ arbitrations, but had 
sat with developing world arbitrators in less than 10 cases.  With a 
broad pool of talent in international arbitration extending across 
national borders and encompassing all genders, the concentration of 
arbitration appointments suggests that there may be untapped value 
in diversifying the pool of arbitrators. 
C.  Counsel’s Experiences with Diversity 
For those who had acted as counsel, we asked two questions 
regarding their experiences.  The first question related to how 
frequently subjects had tribunals with multiple female arbitrators and 
the second question related to how frequently subjects had arbitral 
tribunals with multiple arbitrators from the developing world. 
In the first question, the mode and median answers were 
“never,” and the vast majority of counsel had never argued before a 
tribunal with multiple women.  Specifically, 74.6% (n=290) of 
counsel had never had a tribunal with multiple women; 21.3% (n=83) 
of subjects had only experienced a tribunal with multiple women 1-5 
times; 1.8% (n=7) of counsel experience tribunals with multiple 
women 6-10 times; and the remaining 2.3% (n=9) had acted in more 
than ten cases where there were multiple women.  The light gray bar 
in Figure 3 provides a frequency breakdown demonstrating that the 
majority of counsel had never had more than one woman on a 
tribunal at a time; and only a sliver (less than 5%) had experienced 
two or more female arbitrators in more than five cases.  Contrasted 
with Table 1, where those serving as counsel had served in an 
average of 27 cases, the lack of experience with tribunals containing 
multiple female arbitrators is noteworthy.  It suggests perceptions of 
diversity imbalance in international arbitration were justified. 
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Figure 3: Frequency of Counsel’s Experience with Diverse Tribunals 
 
 
On the theory that female counsel might advise appointment 
of female arbitrators—or that clients willing to retain female counsel 
may be likely to appoint female arbitrators—we explored whether 
counsel’s gender was linked to the number of tribunals with multiple 
female arbitrators.  Using a t-test, we were unable to detect a reliable 
link between mean subject response and gender (t(387)=0.957; 
p=.34; r=.05; n=389).  Although a priori power analysis indicates a  
 
 
sample of over 780 subjects could reliably isolate an effect, the non-
significant latent effect was less than statistically small.211 
For counsel’s experience with developing world arbitrators, 
the results were similar but with a small twist.  The mode and median 
answer were “never”, meaning the majority of counsel had never 
argued before a tribunal with two or more individuals from 
 
 211. The r-values were less than 0.10, which means they were less than statistically 
small.  COHEN ET AL., supra note 190, at 24–26, 115; COHEN ET AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN 
EDUCATION, supra note 73 and accompanying text; see also URDAN, supra note 71, at 68–71.  
A post-hoc power analysis indicates that to reliably detect the latent effect for gender, the 
minimum sample size would need to be 781 to establish .80 power (20% risk of a Type II 
error) and 1045 to establish .90 power (10% risk of a Type II error). 
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developing countries.  Specifically, 59.4% (n=228) of counsel had 
never had a tribunal with two or more developing world arbitrators; 
31.0% (n=119) only experienced a tribunal with multiple developing 
country arbitrators 1-5 times; 4.2% (n=16) of counsel experience 
tribunals with multiple developing country arbitrators 6-10 times; and 
the remaining 5.5% (n=21) had acted in more than ten cases where 
there were multiple arbitrators from the developing world.  The dark 
gray bar in Figure 3 provides a frequency breakdown demonstrating 
that, when acting as counsel, the majority of subjects had never had 
multiple developing world arbitrators on a tribunal; but a small 
number (less than 10%) experienced two or more developing world 
arbitrators in more than five cases. 
Of note, in response to this question, one subject offered an 
unsolicited comment: “when you do Brazil work . . . every tribunal is 
Brazilian.”212  This raised the question of whether counsel from 
developing states reliably experienced having tribunals with multiple 
developing world arbitrators.  Regardless development status, there 
was always a significant and large statistical effect between a 
subject’s development status and experience on tribunals containing 
multiple developing world arbitrators. 
First, using a t-test to assess a binary variable, we identified a 
reliable link between mean subject response and OECD status 
(t(365)=9.445; p<.001; r=.44; n=367).  The direction was such that 
non-OECD counsel were more likely to have experienced tribunals 
with multiple developing world arbitrators.  In contrast, counsel from 
OECD states were less likely to have experienced tribunals with 
multiple developing world arbitrators. 
Second, using an independent groups ANOVA to analyze the 
multiple-category variable, there was a reliable relationship between 
mean subject response and World Bank Status (F(2,364)=52.360; 
p<.001; r=.48; n=367).213  Follow-up analyses using conservative and 
liberal tests revealed that both upper-middle or lower-middle income 
subjects were both more likely to advocate before tribunals with 
multiple developing world arbitrators than high income subjects. 
There was, however, no meaningful difference in how frequently 
upper-middle and lower-middle income counsel had tribunals with 
developing world arbitrators. 
Third, using a correlation coefficient to assess the two 
continuous variables, there was a reliable link between subject’s HDI 
 
 212. Subject number 381 made this comment.  
 213. Follow-up analyses using both conservative and liberal measures reflected that all 
sub-comparisons were significant save one. 
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status and experience with diverse tribunals HDI (r(367)=-.42; 
p<.001).  Like the other tests, where counsel were from less 
developed states, they were more likely to have worked with 
tribunals containing multiple arbitrators from developing countries; 
and the greater the development levels of counsel’s country of origin, 
the less likely they were to have experienced tribunals from 
developing states. 
The results were uniformly significant and all bordered on 
statistically large effects.  These findings may begin to explain why 
developing world arbitrators perceived less of a diversity problem in 
international arbitration.  If the actual experience of developing world 
arbitrators reflects that they are more likely to have worked with 
several tribunals composed of primarily developing world arbitrators, 
one could infer that subjects would be less likely to identify a 
problem with diversity.  By contrast, where developed world 
arbitrators were not experiencing a caseload with arbitrators from a 
broad cross-section of arbitrators with various arbitrators from states 
across a developmental divide, they might identify an imbalance 
related to nationality or development. 
VI.  DISCUSSION 
The results of the data indicate that there were non-trivial 
issues related to diversity in international arbitration related to age, 
gender, and nationality.  The international arbitration community 
should explore what factors contribute to the backgrounds of the 
current arbitration bench and bar.  Focusing on these aspects, and the 
factors contributing to those demographics, provides an opportunity 
to explore what inhibits the full utilization of untapped talent to 
permit broader systemic value and avoid waste of human capital.  
There are several systemic benefits to such an undertaking. 
First, taking diversity issues seriously offers an opportunity to 
strengthen and create infrastructure for international arbitration’s 
future.  As the core group of international arbitrators (and counsel) 
continues to age, it is worthwhile investing in a new generation of 
arbitrators and counsel to ensure that know-how and capacity is not 
lost over time.  Efforts and mentoring programs, such as Young 
ICCA and other groups focused on developing the next generation of 
the arbitration community, offer constructive solutions to address this 
gap.  Bringing younger individuals into the fold increases diversity 
and the breadth of ideas and experiences, and could benefit the 
community as a whole. 
The benefits of diversity go beyond age.  The parties involved 
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in dispute settlement, who control the appointment of lawyers and 
often exercise choice in the appointment of arbitrators, may benefit 
from the diversity.  Shareholders and boards focusing on diversity, 
for example, may wish to use their choice of counsel and arbitrators 
to showcase their commitment to diversity.  Similarly, state parties 
involved in international arbitration might have transparency 
requirements requiring them to comply with equal opportunity or 
diversity obligations.  Moreover, parties may not always identify 
with, feel fully heard by, or be able to communicate in a manner that 
is fully forthright with lawyers within the international arbitration 
community; this, in turn, suggests arbitration services might be 
enhanced through expanded market competition. 
Second, exploring diversity levels and identifying methods 
for enhancing diversity could serve to enhance legitimacy, public 
trust, and procedural justice.214  When considering long-term 
efficacy, the international arbitration community could benefit from 
exploring how to maintain and develop reservoirs of goodwill during 
a time of global economic transition.  One strategic way of enhancing 
legitimacy is to have appropriate and balanced representation before 
courts and tribunals, international or domestic.  Where adjudication is 
“representative of the people, [it] will be considered more legitimate, 
and can count on greater trust and confidence from the public at 
large.  Conversely, lack of diversity in [adjudication] could 
undermine public confidence . . . .”215  The former Chief Judge of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Deanell 
Tacha, notes that, “diversity is about bringing together collective 
knowledge, born from an array of experiences, in order to ensure the 
judiciary and its decisions are respected and followed.”216  These 
concerns translate to the international context, whether international 
 
 214. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
INSTITUTIONS (1998); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 
(1990) [hereinafter FRANCK, THE POWER]; Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy and 
NAFTA’s Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 37 (2003).  While beyond the 
scope of our analysis, we observe that political scientists often link legitimacy to the 
“‘reservoir’ of good will” on which institutions rely in the short term to address unpopular 
decisions as well as long-term deep-seated support.  Scherer, supra note 140, at 625; see also 
DAVID EASTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS 124–26 (1965); Gregory A. 
Caldiera & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 635, 636–37 (1992). 
 215. Kalantry, supra note 147, at 87. 
 216. Deanell Tacha, Diversity in the Judiciary:  A Conversation with Deanell Tacha, 59 
U. KAN. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2011); see also Kalantry, supra note 147, at 88. (“there must be 
gender parity in the judiciary to further equality of opportunity for all people, enhance 
courts’ legitimacy and strengthen the rule of law.”).  
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courts and tribunals217 or international arbitration.218  As Chiara 
Giorgetti explains, an “important measure that can be taken to 
strengthen the international arbitration system is to enlarge the pool 
of arbitrators.  More arbitrators from outside Europe and North 
America, and more women, are needed.”219  Observing that it “is 
widely accepted both at domestic and international levels that ‘a 
diverse judiciary is an indispensable requirement of any 
democracy,’”220 Giorgetti argues that in a transnational setting with 
global economic implications like international arbitration, broad 
representation is even more important.221  International arbitration 
could therefore benefit from enhanced legitimacy and procedural 
justice by having adjudicators who reflect the society to whom they 
are responsible.  Particularly for ITA, which involves policy matters, 
it is critical to both do and be seen to do justice.222  Given the value 
of symbolic legitimacy,223 there is untapped value in having an 
 
 217. See Grossman, Sex on the Bench, supra note 112; Grossman, Legitimacy and 
International Adjudicative Bodies, supra note 121; Grossman, The Normative Legitimacy of 
International Courts, supra note 122; Kumar & Rose, supra note 60. 
 218. Jan Paulsson has also observed that, “[a]rbitration obviously cannot endure if those 
asked to consent to its authority are mystified and disaffected.  The process will be rejected 
if it is perceived that while the arbitrants come from the four corners of the world, rights of 
advocacy and the power to decide are reserved to mandarins or high priests operating in a 
few dominant cities.”  Jan Paulsson, The Alexander Lecture at the Chartered Institute of 
Arbitrators:  Universal Arbitration—What We Gain, What We Lose (Nov. 29, 2012), 
(transcript available at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/cdn/files/gar/articles/ 
jan_Paulsson_Universal_Arbitration_-_what_we_gain_what_we_lose.pdf).   
 219. Giorgetti, supra note 159, at 480−81. 
 220. Id. at 481 (citing Centre for Int’l Cts. & Tribunals, Selecting International Judges: 
Principle, Process and Politics 37, UNIV. COLL. LONDON DISCUSSION PAPER, available at 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/cict/docs/Selecting_Int_Judges.pdf (quoting Lady Hale, The 
Appointment and Removal of Judges:  Independence and Diversity, International 
Association of Women Judges 8th Biennial Conference (May 3–7, 2006)) (last visited May 
16, 2015). 
 221. Tom Tyler’s research reflects that enhanced levels of procedural justice are more 
likely to generate voluntary compliance with the law, even when a judicial decision is 
adverse.  See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006); Tom R. Tyler, 
Procedural Justice, Legitimacy and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283 (2003). 
 222. See Libananco Holdings Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Turk., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/8, 
Decision on Preliminary Issues, ¶ 79 (Jun. 23, 2008), available at http://www.italaw.com/ 
sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0465.pdf (“The Tribunal recalls the well-known saying, 
very frequently repeated in legal discussion, that it is not enough that justice should be done, 
it must also manifestly be seen to be done.”). 
 223. See generally FRANCK, THE POWER, supra note 214, at 91–101 (discussing how 
symbolic validation impacts legitimacy); Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International 
Governance:  A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 596; Grossman, Legitimacy and International Adjudicative Bodies, supra note 122, at 
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inclusive group of international adjudicators that provides expressive, 
representational and modeling functions. 
Third, although more speculative, it is possible that greater 
diversity could facilitate distributive justice and higher quality 
outcomes. Having greater representation of different perspectives 
during deliberation could aid a more comprehensive appreciation of 
parties’ positions and underlying evidence.  This, in turn, could 
generate higher quality awards.224  There is, however, difficulty in 
demonstrating that appointing non-median arbitrators creates 
different outcomes—or that different types of diversity will generate 
specific effects on the process or the outcome.225 
Generating diversity, however, could prove challenging as 
international arbitration permits parties to directly control two 
arbitrator appointments (and potentially the appointment of the chair, 
as well). Parties have incentives to select arbitrators that either 
maximize the likelihood of their preferred result in a given case or 
minimize the possibility of a negative result.  Likewise, parties may 
wish to appoint known-qualities in their arbitration counsel and 
arbitrators and thereby decrease the risks outcomes generated by 
untested arbitrators.  These incentives place new international 
arbitrators at a disadvantage, which minority status may 
exacerbate.226  Nevertheless, boards of directors or other entities 
could create pressure to foster diversity in their use of lawyers and 
arbitrators,227 or there may be natural incentives to appoint more 
 
116.  
 224. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 225. For example, in the context of ITA, research suggests that presence of tribunals 
with presiding arbitrators from developing countries may not affect outcome or potentially 
be linked to developing country arbitrators finding against developing states; the data has 
been unable to find that tribunals containing women were reliably different in terms of 
outcomes.  Franck, Development and Outcomes, supra note 28; see FRANCK, supra note 29.  
The results, however, may also reflect the small proportions of female arbitrators and 
arbitrators from developing countries.  It is possible that, as the population expands, that 
there may be a meaningful link with arbitration outcomes.  
 226. See, e.g., Ilhung Lee, Practice and Predicament:  The Nationality of the 
International Arbitrator, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 603 (2007) (providing results of how party 
appointment attitudes varied in ICA depending upon arbitrators’ nationalities or the 
nationalities of their spouses). 
 227. See, e.g., Andrew Bruck & Andrew Canter, Supply, Demand, and the Changing 
Economics of Large Firms, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2087, 2112 (2008) (discussing initiatives by the 
Minority Corporate Counsel Association to promote diversity in legal hiring and observing 
how after Rick Palmore, Sara Lee’s general counsel, circulated a petition for companies to 
terminate relationships with law firms failing to promote diversity, “[s]tories began 
circulating, many of them apocryphal, about general counsels dumping some of the nation’s 
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broadly.228  Where such incentives do not exist, arbitral institutions 
such as ICSID, the LCIA, the ICC, or the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration at The Hague can generate increased diversity by 
strategically utilizing those appointments they control.  Initial 
analyses exploring ITA cases reflected that chair appointments by 
institutions like ICSID exhibited greater diversity (in terms of 
development status) as compared to appointments made by co-
arbitrators.229  This suggests that stakeholders may wish to follow 
institutions’ lead in promoting greater diversity in international 
arbitration. 
Comparatively, many national courts have arguably done 
better at promoting gender equity than international arbitration.  
Quantitative analyses on the prevalence of women and developing 
world lawyers in international courts and tribunals indicate that 
international arbitration is roughly equivalent but certainly not 
worse.230  Yet, this is arguably not the appropriate basis for 
comparing international arbitration, and the better frame of reference 
is to compare international arbitration to other international courts 
and tribunals that also exhibit low diversity levels.  Two critical 
questions are therefore worthy of consideration by the international 
arbitration community.  First, what is the appropriate yardstick 
against which to measure diversity levels in international arbitration?  
Second, does international arbitration wish to be a leader or a laggard 
in promoting diversity in international law?  Given the potential 
effect of diversity imbalances on perceived legitimacy, the 
international arbitration community should consider taking the lead 
in educating stakeholders about the value of diversity in international 
adjudication.  Diversity can be a function of market forces as parties 
to a dispute typically hold the power in obtaining counsel and 
appointing arbitrators.  With an increasing focus in both the public 
and private spheres on gender and other forms of diversity, there is 
minimal harm in educating stakeholders about the benefits for them 
 
most prestigious law firms over diversity issues”). 
 228. See, e.g., Michele DeStefano, Nonlawyers Influencing Lawyers:  Too Many Cooks 
in the Kitchen or Stone Soup?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2791, 2803 (2012) (“[S]enior in-house 
attorneys insist on diverse teams from their outsourcers. Senior managers also insist on 
diverse teams internally.  This is because, as a senior legal counselor of a large, publicly 
traded corporation contended, ‘combining a broad range of backgrounds and experiences—
in our outside counsel, in our in-house legal team and in our greater work force—leads to the 
development of creative strategies and sophisticated ideas.’”) (footnotes omitted). 
 229. FRANCK, supra note 29. 
 230. There were also similar patterns in some data related to large law firms.  See supra 
notes 176–77 and accompanying text. 
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to opt for balance.  Arbitral institutions with the capacity to appoint 
arbitrators should also be conscious of the value of promoting 
diversity without sacrificing quality. 
Given the enforcement regime available to international 
arbitration awards, it is in the long-term interest of the international 
arbitration community to redress areas of concern to promote its 
longevity and legitimacy.  As Salim Moollan observed: 
on the one hand, the formal discourse repeated at 
every conference we go to emphasizing the 
inclusiveness of international arbitration, and, on the 
other hand, the perception of our field, in the 
developing world as predominantly Euro- and 
American-centric.  This gives rise to a risk of 
arbitration being perceived as foreign process imposed 
from abroad, as an unwanted but inevitable corollary 
of trade and investment flows.231   
He further explained that the conceptual premise of holding an ICCA 
Congress in Mauritius:  
is that the answer to this is to make sure that the 
developing world has its say in the process and in its 
development and for international arbitration to 
progressively to become part and parcel of the legal 
culture of developing countries.  The aim is 
accordingly to create a platform run for the benefit of 
the region as a whole to build capacity in the field of 
international dispute resolution so that, within a 
generation Africa can draw on the expertise of 
specialist African arbitrators and lawyers.232 
Ultimately, the data reflect that diversity issues in 
international arbitration are complex and not subject to a uniform 
narrative.  Nevertheless, the data shed light on the core demographics 
of international arbitration and raise questions about the way to 
improve diversity and enhance its legitimacy.  International 
arbitration could benefit from an identification of those factors that 
generate barriers and the consideration of structural and incremental 
solutions to address concerns and generate a sustainable international 
arbitration system for the future. 
 
 231. Moollan, supra note 52, at 2:13–2:40. 
 232. Id. at 2:41–3:16.  
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VII.  LIMITATIONS 
It is important to identify research limitations to prevent 
consumers of scientific research from drawing unwarranted 
inferences and to aid assessment of the research’s value.  Throughout 
this Article, we have included cautions (in the primary text and in 
footnotes) about the limitations of survey questions generally and our 
questions specifically, the limitations of statistical tests, and the 
limitations of the analyzed sample.  We identified concerns related to 
sample representativeness, the risk of selection effects that derive 
from to the potential over-inclusion of North American subjects, the 
under-inclusion of other subjects, the use of English language in an 
international dispute settlement conference, the potential focus on 
elite players rather than newer entrants, and fiscal cost of attendance.  
Beyond traditional caveats about drawing inferences from scientific 
research,233 it is appropriate to highlight other issues. 
First, as ICCA participants had the option to not attend the 
initial plenary and also not complete the survey, there is a risk of a 
self-selection bias that may limit inferences.  Only fifty-five percent 
of ICCA registrants attended the first plenary.  This means, although 
the response rate was reasonable, a number of conference participants 
were not represented in the survey results.  Similarly, although 
distributing surveys at elite conferences may improve response rates, 
the method also necessarily limits the sample to those arbitration 
practitioners interested in the conference, willing to attend, and able 
to attend.234 
Second, as the survey involved self-reporting, there is a risk 
of error.  The error might take the form of misremembered 
information.  For example, while subjects might identify whether 
they had served as counsel or arbitrator, subjects’ memory may not 
accurately reflect the precise number of cases.  Similarly, subjects 
may intentionally misreport to inject error into their responses.  
Finally, self-reporting may generate error related to a self-serving 
bias should subjects answer in what they deem to be a socially 
desirable manner or are otherwise overly optimistic.235 
Third, there is a risk of external validity over time.  The data 
 
 233. Franck et al., supra note 102, at 885–99. 
 234. See Cheng, supra note 35, at 1279 (identifying similar concerns in distributing 
surveys to judges at judicial conferences). 
 235. TALI SHAROT, THE OPTIMISM BIAS:  A TOUR OF THE IRRATIONALLY POSITIVE BRAIN 
16–18 (2011); see Emily Pronin, et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder:  Divergent 
Perceptions in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781 (2004). 
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from ICCA are now a historical snapshot.  It is possible that several 
of the findings will change over time.  Certain findings related to 
diversity might change over time as the group of arbitrators expands.  
Future research should reassess these aspects periodically with more 
sophisticated measures and models.  In this way, we can reconsider 
what we know now as we add to our knowledge over time.236 
Fourth, for those instances where we conducted tests to look 
for group differences and obtained non-significant results, it is not 
possible to claim there is no relationship.  As discussed, even with a 
base sample of over 500 subjects, the effect sizes were so small that 
some tests were technically underpowered.237  Future research with 
an expanded sample size is required before reaching definitive 
conclusions about the lack of a statistically reliable effect.  For many 
of the non-significant results, the effect sizes were small or less than 
small suggesting that any latent differences may not be practically 
meaningful; and a sample with sufficient power to detect even the 
small effects will require between 1,200-1,600 subjects.  A well-
attended future ICCA Congress or similar event where there is a 
transnational and critical mass of arbitration specialists would be an 
appropriate venue for such an undertaking. 
More research is required to create the sufficient power, 
stability, statistical control, and enhanced validity necessary to reach 
more definitive conclusions.  Given the practical challenges in 
obtaining a sufficiently large set of subjects, it may be challenging to 
recreate this research.  Those challenges do not diminish the value of 
future research providing replication that confirms—and expands—
upon existing research. 
CONCLUSION 
The data reflect that the modern “invisible college” of 
international arbitration is complex and not subject to a flat, unitary 
narrative.  An appreciation of the nuance and complexity creates a 
powerful opportunity.  The data can aid the international arbitration 
community’s exploration of evidence-based solutions to identifiable 
challenges rather than reliance on unrepresentative anecdotes.238 
 
 236. See Franck et al., supra note 102, at 888–89, 900–02. 
 237. See supra notes 190, 211 and accompanying text. 
 238. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Evidence-Based Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2011) 
(exploring opportunities for evidence-based law); see also David L. Sackett et al., Evidence 
Based Medicine:  What It Is and What It Isn’t, 312 BRIT. MED. J. 71 (1996) (discussing 
evidence-based approaches to the practice of medicine). 
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The demographics of key actors in international arbitration 
reflected bright spots but likewise reflected areas for improvement.  
International arbitration has moved past historic Cold War divides.  
The data demonstrated that arbitrators and counsel comprised a broad 
spectrum of nationalities, continents, and languages.  Nevertheless, 
the data reflected disproportionate levels of representation by men 
from states in North America and Europe, which have high levels of 
economic development.  Only 24% of counsel and 17.6% of 
arbitrators were women.239  Meanwhile, 68.6% of counsel and 76% 
of arbitrators were from Europe and North America; 75.2% of 
counsel and 82.4% of arbitrators were from OECD states, and 76.5% 
of counsel and 84.8% of arbitrators were from high-income 
countries.  The data supported claims that international arbitration is 
a “white male game.”240 
Diversity challenges within international arbitration are some 
of the most challenging, but also the most rewarding, as they 
generate an opportunity for arbitration to take a leadership role within 
the broader community of international courts and tribunals.  More 
than 75% of ICCA subjects identified that they agreed (either 
somewhat or strongly) with the proposition that international 
arbitration experiences diversity challenges.  Yet, the data reflected 
heterogeneities in perceived challenges.  Women and younger 
subjects were more likely to identify diversity challenges than men or 
older subjects.  Subjects from developing countries (no matter how 
defined) were less likely than their developed world counterparts to 
identify diversity challenges.  These perceived experiences, however, 
were juxtaposed with actual experiences related to gender and 
development status. 
The data also reflected that becoming an international 
arbitrator can be challenging, and the proportion of women 
arbitrators was only 17.6%. Once women broke the “glass ceiling,” 
statistical tests could not identify a meaningful difference in the 
number of appointments that women obtained as compared to men.  
Yet, roughly one-third of arbitrators had never sat on a tribunal with  
 
 
 239. There was some evidence that, for the subset of arbitrators, the ICCA respondents 
had a disproportionately large number of women arbitrators.  See supra note 132 and 
accompanying text. 
 240. Peter F. Phillips, ADR Continental Drift:  It Remains a White, Male Game, NAT’L 
L.J., Nov. 27, 2006, available at http://www.businessconflictmanagement.com/pdf/ 
BCMpress_08.pdf; Maria R. Volpe et al., Barriers to Participation:  Challenges Faced by 
Members of Underrepresented Racial and Ethnic Groups in Entering, Remaining, and 
Advancing in the ADR Field, 35 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 119 (2008). 
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a woman, and more than 75% of counsel reported they had never had 
a tribunal with multiple female arbitrators. 
Analyzing the development status of international arbitration 
specialists also reflected diversity was complex.  Recognizing that 
developing world arbitrators were less likely to identify diversity 
problems in international arbitration, two aspects were noteworthy.  
The first was the demographic data reflecting that OECD and/or 
high-income arbitrators made up more than 75% of the arbitrators in 
our sample.  The second was, irrespective of how development status 
was defined, developing world arbitrators experienced statistically 
lower numbers of appointments than their developed world 
colleagues.  Even counting developing world arbitrators’ own 
appointments, approximately 40% of arbitrators reported never 
having sat on a tribunal with a developing world arbitrator; and 
59.4% of counsel reported never having worked with a tribunal 
containing multiple arbitrators from developing countries.  Those 
findings must be contextualized against tests demonstrating that 
counsel from developing countries were much more likely to 
experience tribunals comprised of developing world arbitrators. 
  There is an important normative question about what is the 
appropriate baseline against which diversity in international 
arbitration should be evaluated.  On the one hand, one might look to 
baselines established by national legislatures and judiciaries.  On the 
other hand, given the transnational nature of international arbitration, 
perhaps the baseline offered by public international law is most 
appropriate.  Using either baseline, the small size of the pool of 
women and developing world arbitrators was noteworthy.  As 
suggested by Sundaresh Menon241 and Salim Moollan,242 discussions 
about diversity are worthwhile and may enhance arbitration’s long-
term legitimacy and sustainability.  In a time when there is a broad 
pool of talent in international arbitration, and that talent extends 
across national borders243 and encompasses both genders, there is 
untapped value in diversifying the pool of arbitrators. 
 
 241. See Menon, supra note 126, ¶¶ 74–76 (observing that the international arbitration 
community should take into account the unique circumstances of developing nations and 
make an effort to engage developing countries into the development of norms); see also 
Menon, Where We Have Been, supra note 126, at 1035 (“I believe that this is the essential 
challenge of this age–we are moving very rapidly from a time when the key players knew 
one another; when they often looked similar and spoke similarly; and when they had a 
common legal, cultural and social background; to a period in which there is unprecedented 
growth in numbers and in diversity.”). 
 242. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 243. See LOBEL, supra note 98; Law, supra note 98, at 1323–30. 
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There may also be pragmatic reasons to consider how best to 
diversify the “invisible college” of arbitrators.  First, as international 
business activity becomes more complex and international arbitration 
expands, it is critical to have a pool of arbitrators who are available to 
resolve disputes and appreciate the unique context from which the 
dispute arises.  This minimizes risk of delay, decreases costs and 
increases stakeholder satisfaction.  Second, as the existing pool of 
international arbitrators continues to age, it is necessary to ensure 
institutional and historical knowledge is transferred to the next 
generation.  The objective should be to prevent an over-concentration 
of arbitration experience, so that a broad pool of arbitrators can 
continue to offer quality adjudicative services in the future.  Third, to 
the extent that conflicts of interests within law firms or subject-matter 
conflicts of interest limit the services that arbitrators can provide, it is 
necessary to have both breadth and depth in the pool of potential 
appointees.  Finally, as more countries’ economies grow, the demand 
for international legal services may increase and generate new 
opportunities for individuals in developing world legal systems. 
The results provided in this Article are designed to elucidate 
the “invisible college” of international arbitrators and identify the tip 
of a larger empirical iceberg.  We applaud ICCA for taking the first 
step in generating transparent information about international 
arbitration.  In light of the data, we offer some suggestions.  First, we 
encourage researchers to continue exploring how to generate 
scientifically rigorous data that can inform stakeholders and permit 
reasoned discussions about how best to improve international 
arbitration.  Second, given the self-awareness of diversity concerns, it 
would be constructive to explore factors creating impediments to 
maximizing untapped arbitration talent.  Third, it could be 
constructive to identify opportunities for the diversification and 
capacity building of counsel and arbitrators that neither sacrifice 
quality nor unduly burden party autonomy.  We hope this Article 
offers a constructive basis for a dialogue about evidence-driven 
approaches to enhance the legitimacy of international arbitration and 
promote viable systems of dispute settlement for the future.
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ANNEX 1:  RELEVANT SURVEY MATERIALS 
 
Demographic Questions 
Your Sex (Male or Female): 
Your Nationality (or Nationalities): 
Your Current Age: 
Your Mother Tongue: 
Please identify other languages that you speak and/or write proficiently: 
Please indicate jurisdiction(s) where you received your legal education: 
 ☐ Common Law   ☐ Civil Law ☐ Both 
Please indicate the number of cases where you have acted as: 
 Counsel in international arbitration: 
 Expert in international arbitration: 
 Arbitrator in an international commercial arbitration: 
 Arbitrator in an international investment treaty arbitration: 
Adjudicator in a public international law dispute (International Court 
of Justice, World Trade Organization proceedings, etc.): 
 Judge in a national court proceeding: 
 
ICCA Questions 
International arbitration has diversity challenges related to gender, 
nationality, or age. [1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree)] 
 
In my experience as arbitrator, I have sat with a/another woman: [More 
than 10 times; 6-10 times; 1-5 times; Never] 
 
In my experience as arbitrator, I have sat with an arbitrator from a 
developing country: [More than 10 times; 6-10 times; 1-5 times; Never] 
 
In my experience as arbitrator, I have sat with more than one arbitrator from 
a developing country: [More than 10 times; 6-10 times; 1-5 times; Never] 
 
In my experience as counsel, I have had an arbitral tribunal that has 
multiple women: [More than 10 times; 6-10 times; 1-5 times; Never] 
 
In my experience as counsel, I have had a arbitral tribunal with multiple 
arbitrators from developing countries: [More than 10 times; 6-10 times; 1-5 
times; Never] 
